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in Sudan. The information management function was not assessed in this evaluation and no
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2. On 29 April 2006, the GICHD and the Government of National Unity signed a Cooperation
Memorandum covering possible cooperation related to training, IMSMA, research, and
technical expertise for humanitarian demining. This evaluation was commissioned by UNDP
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4. The time available for the country mission did not allow for a thorough assessment of the
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In January 2005, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
(SPLM) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), ending a 22-year conflict.
Contamination from landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) was one of the
many post-conflict challenges facing the country. Fear of this contamination inhibited the
return of displaced people and constrained the delivery of humanitarian aid and the operations
of international peacekeeping forces fielded through the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).
Even before the CPA, the warring parties had reached agreements with the UN and
international NGOs to initiate mine action operations. Beginning in 2001, a series of
initiatives sought to lay the groundwork for a large mine action programme while
simultaneously fostering cooperation between the warring parties. The CPA subsequently
stated that the UN will assist the Parties’ demining efforts, leading to the creation of a UN
Mine Action Office (UNMAO) headed by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and
including UNDP and UNICEF personnel. The UNMAO mandate covers:
•
•
•

Development of a mine action programme (survey, clearance of priority areas, victim
assistance, and mine risk education);
Clearance of priority roads and sites to facilitate the deployment of the military and
civilian police components of UNMIS;
National capacity building support to both the North and the South.

As UNMAO had a mandate to provide demining support to UNMIS peacekeeping forces and
to humanitarian operations, the initial focus of UNMAS, as lead agency, was to get operations
established. In spite of the vastness of the country, the decrepit infrastructure, and the modest
level of knowledge concerning the scope and nature of the explosives contamination,
UNMAS and its partners have done an excellent job in establishing mine action operations
and coordinating these through UNMAO.
However, the UNMIS Mission Plan also calls for the formulation and implementation of a
transition plan to “…pass responsibility for management of the UN Mine Action Office to
national authorities…” and to develop “…fully operational national mine action
coordination and implementation capacity.”
Accordingly, the UNDP – as the lead agency for support to capacity development in the UN
system – fielded a Senior Technical Advisor (STA) for mine action in March 2004 to initiate
its project to support the development of mine action capacities in Sudan, focussing initially
on the National Policy and Strategic Frameworks. In November 2005, a new UNDP STA
formulated the current project (Support to National Mine Action Capacity Development) for
the period 2006-07, which sought to assist national authorities establish a …National Mine
Action Legal and Institutional Framework, with all necessary sub structures, capable of
planning, co-coordinating, implementing, and monitoring all aspects of mine action in the
country, within the framework of International Mine Action Standards.
In early 2007, UNMIS commissioned an evaluation of the Sudan Mine Action Programme
which concluded that capacity development was the biggest weakness in the programme. At
the request of UNDP-Sudan, the GICHD fielded a two person team from 22 to 30 October
2007 to evaluate the UNDP project, with the principal aim to …evaluate the performance and
overall approach of the project…to take stock of the achievements made, identify major gaps,
lessons learned and make recommendations for the future direction for the project. Given the
limited time available for the evaluation team, it was agreed with the UNDP country office
that the exercise would focus on strategic issues and the way forward. Among the key
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conclusions reached by the evaluation team are that:
1. Mine action has made important contributions to broader processes and programmes,
including:
• Peace-building in the lead-up to the CPA and in its aftermath;
• The return of displaced peoples and the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
• The restoration of internal security and the expansion of secure areas;
• The provision of an important point of entry for constructive engagement by the
international community in Sudan.
2. Mine action is one of the fields in which the GoNU and GoSS cooperate most effectively
with one another, and with the international community.
3. The UNMAO has established an effective programme in a very challenging environment,
while international NGOs have also established significant mine action capacities within
Sudan. Cooperation among mine action actors is generally good, and has been improving.
4. Both Sudanese governments have made significant moves towards establishing national
capacities to coordinate and implement mine action programmes.
5. There is no clear vision of the make-up and workings of the mine action programme in
Sudan following the end of the UNMIS mandate in 2011. Accordingly, there is no long
term strategic plan that clarifies what type of mine action capacities will be required, and
how to build those capacities.
6. The direct operational mandate of UNMAO could complicate the development of national
capacities. As well, specific irritants are emerging which, if unaddressed, could further
complicate relations between and the of ability of UNMAO and national authorities to
formulate a common strategy for mine action.
7. UNDP assistance has helped the Sudanese governments put in place the basic building
blocks of a national mine action programme, with (for the most part) a sound institutional
and organisational make-up.
8. UNMAO partners have provided significant training for the staffs of the national mine
action organs, but these personnel must be given the opportunity to apply what they have
learnt.
9. UNDP has not yet focussed sufficient attention on helping Sudanese authorities formulate
their own strategic plans based on:
• a clear assessment of the likely mine action needs following the departure of UNMIS,
and
• clear decisions on the strategy for developing the national capacities that will be
required to meet those needs.
10. The UNDP country management team recognises the contributions made by mine action,
the continuing need for mine action and for continued UNDP efforts to assist national
authorities in developing their capacities.
Concerning the way forward, the core issue is the lack of a common vision of what mine
action capabilities Sudanese authorities will require to address the contamination that is likely
to remain after the UNMIS mandate ends. Until this is in place, Sudanese authorities will not
be in a position to formulate a long-term strategy for their national mine action programme.
Such a strategy is needed as a basis for (from Sudanese authorities) a realistic capacity
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development plan and (from the UN perspective) a feasible transition plan for the successful
transfer of responsibilities to national authorities.
The bulk of the recommendations address the requirements for:
•
•
•
•

A realistic long-term needs assessment, to provide the basis for…
An appropriate long-term strategy for the national mine action programme, which
will allow…
Realistic plans for further development of Sudanese mine action capacities and for
transferring responsibilities from the UN to national authorities, and finally…
Plans by the international mine action organisations (NGOs as well as the UN
agencies) for supporting capacity development.

In addition, recommendations are provided for making best use of the Joint Integrated
Demining Units (JIDUs) and for the establishment of a Southern Sudan Mine Action Centre,
distinct from the Southern Sudan De-mining Commission (SSDC).
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INTRODUCTION
In January 2005, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
(SPLM)1 signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), ending a conflict that had raged for
22 years. Contamination from landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) was one of
the many post-conflict challenges facing the country. Fear of this contamination inhibited the
return of displaced people and constrained the delivery of humanitarian aid and the operations of
international peacekeeping forces fielded through the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).
Even before the CPA, the warring parties had reached agreements with the UN to initiate mine
action operations. Shortly after the 2002 Nuba Mountains Cease Fire Agreement, the GoS and
SPLM/A signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the UN Mine Action Service to establish
an Emergency Mine Action in Sudan. In 2004, GoS, SPLM, and the UN signed the first versions
of the Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework and the Sudan National Mine Action
Policy Framework. These stated that mine action in Sudan would have a “one country approach”,
presaging provisions in the CPA which provided for a “one country, two systems” approach until
a 2011 referendum on possible independence in Southern Sudan.
The groundwork laid from 2002 allowed the UN system and international mine action NGOs to
respond rapidly once the CPA was signed. The CPA itself states that UNMIS will assist the
Parties’ demining efforts, and the UN established a UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) headed
by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and including UNDP and UNICEF personnel. The
UNMAO mandate covers:
•
•
•

Development of a mine action programme, surveying of potentially contaminated area,
clearance of priority areas, victim assistance, and mine risk education.
Clearance of priority roads and sites to facilitate the deployment of the military and
civilian police components of the Mission.
National capacity building support to both the North and the South.

As UNMAO had a mandate to provide demining support to UNMIS peacekeeping forces and to
humanitarian operations, the initial focus of UNMAS, as lead agency, was to get its operations
up-and-running. In spite of the vastness of the country, the decrepit road and communication
networks, and the modest level of knowledge concerning the scope and nature of the explosives
contamination, UNMAS has done an excellent job in establishing and coordinating mine action
operations. However, the UNMIS Mission Plan also calls for the formulation and implementation
of a Transition Plan to …pass responsibility for management of the UN Mine Action Office to
national authorities… and to develop …fully operational national mine action coordination and
implementation capacity.
Accordingly, the UNDP – as the lead agency for support to capacity development in the UN
system – fielded a Senior Technical Advisor (STA) for mine action in March 2004 to initiate its
project to support the development of mine action capacities in Sudan, focussing initially on the
National Policy and Strategic Frameworks. In November 2005, a new UNDP STA formulated the
current project for the period 2006-07, which sought to assist national authorities establish a
…National Mine Action Legal and Institutional Framework, with all necessary sub structures,
1

The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) is the military arm of the SPLM.
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capable of planning, co-coordinating, implementing, and monitoring all aspects of mine action in
the country, within the framework of International Mine Action Standards.
In early 2007, UNMIS commissioned an evaluation of the Sudan Mine Action Programme which
concluded that capacity development was the biggest weakness in the programme.2
At the request of UNDP-Sudan, the GICHD fielded a two person team3 from 22-30 October 2007
to evaluate the UNDP project, with the principal aim to …evaluate the performance and overall
approach of the project…to take stock of the achievements made, identify major gaps, lessons
learned and make recommendations for the future direction for the project.4
The Terms of Reference for the evaluation specified 15 objectives. Unfortunately, the evaluation
team had only a limited time available to undertake missions to both Khartoum and Juba.5
Accordingly, it was agreed with the UNDP Country Office to focus on recommendations for the
future direction of the project, including inputs to feed into the preparation of the United Nations
Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Sudan for 2009-2012.
The remainder of this report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides background information
on the conflict, explosives contamination, and the mine action response, as well as a brief
discussion on key political and economic developments. Chapter 3 gives the analysis of the
UNDP mine action project itself, including relationships with the broader UNDP country
programme and the overall mine action programme. Chapter 4 outlines the conclusions drawn,
while the final Chapter provides the way forward, including recommendations for UNDP and
UNMAO.
Both UNMAO and the mine action unit in UNDP Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery
(BCPR) provided thoughtful and useful comments on the draft report. These, along with brief
responses from the GICHD Evaluation Team, are reproduced in Annexes 4 and 5 respectively,
preceded by:
•
•
•

Annex 1 – Terms of Reference
Annex 2 – Itinerary & List of People Met
Annex 3 – Documents Consulted

2

Gomer et al, 2007, Evaluation of the Mine Action Programme in Sudan for the United Nations
Mine Action Service.
3
Ted Paterson, Team Leader, and Vera Bohle, mine action evaluation specialist.
4
The full ToRs are provided in Appendix 1.
5
Vera Bohle and Léonie Barnes (at the time, also a GICHD staff member) had conducted short
missions earlier in 2007 as part of an evaluation of EC-funded mine action in Sudan, which
provided the team with a foundation on which to build.
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BACKGROUND
OVERALL CONTEXT
PEACE AND CONFLICT
Sudan is considered by some analysts as the world’s most fragile state.6 The country has been
wracked by internal conflict since before its independence in 1956. While the principal conflict
has been between the national government in Khartoum and Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement (SPLM7) in the South, insurgencies have also occurred in the East and (continuing
today) in Darfur. In each of these areas, the central government has pursued a policy of arming
splinter groups, resulting in fighting among rebel factions.
Textbox 1 – Sudan as a Fragile State
In some sense, characterising Sudan as a fragile state seems odd, given the central government
in Khartoum has successfully maintained its power and control of resources for twenty years.
However, the country is fragile on a number of inter-related dimensions, including:
•
•
•
•
•

The lack of broad-based democratic institutions and government legitimacy in both
Khartoum and the South
Multiple extended conflicts, both against the central government and among rebel
factions
Regional insecurity, with conflicts in neighbouring countries spilling into Sudan, further
complicating efforts to restore domestic security
The absence of effective state structures in much of the country
Increased dependence of governments on oil revenues, providing governments with
financial resources even in the absence of popular support based on accountability.

Haslie, Anita and Axel Borchgrevink, 2007, International Engagement in Sudan after the CPA, Norwegian
Institute of International Affairs

This is not to deny that important progress has been achieved in recent years. Following the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) sponsored peace talks in Kenya from
September 2002 to December 2004, the parties (the Government of Sudan and the SPLM) signed
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005.
The CPA states that a power-sharing government consisting of the Government of National
Union (GoNU) and the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) will rule the country for six years
until early 2011. The CPA grants the South a significant amount of autonomy, and provides for a
referendum on secession to be held after a six-year Interim Period. During the Interim Period
however, the parties agreed to work together ‘to make unity attractive’, and agreements were
made on wealth sharing.8 Final decisions on some thorny issues were deferred: for example, the
final North-South boundary has not yet been agreed in the “Three Transitional Areas”.9
A peace agreement was also achieved in the East in 2006. However, the conflict in Darfur has
6

Sudan ranks top of the ‘risk of failure index’ – ahead of Iraq and Somalia! Fund for Peace and
Foreign Policy, The Failed States Index 2007, Foreign Policy, July/August 2007,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3865
7
The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) is the military arm of the SPLM.
8
The GoSS is to receive 50% of the revenues from oil production in the South.
9
The Three Areas (Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states, plus the Abyei area) have a mixed
ethnic composition and oil reserves, and the disputed North-South border runs through them.
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continued, in spite of the presence of African peacekeepers and a number of internationally
sponsored peace conferences.
INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT
The CPA also asks for UN involvement to …support the implementation of the comprehensive
peace agreement… In response, through its Resolution No. 1590 (23 March 2005), the Security
Council authorised the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) – an integrated peacekeeping mission
including political and humanitarian components.10
The international community has attempted to engage with Sudan in a coordinated fashion. The
World Bank and UN undertook a extensive needs assessment (the Joint Assessment Mission –
JAM) over 14 months following the request of the GoS and the SPLM. This led to two broad
plans, endorsed by both the GoS and SPLM respectively, and the creation of separate MultiDonor Trust Funds for the GoNU and GoSS. Unfortunately, implementation of projects financed
by these MDTFs has been slow, leading to criticism of the World Bank – the administrator of the
trust funds – for imposing overly burdensome requirements for financial control and
accountability. As well, a number of important donors have remained outside the MDTF
mechanism, with some following parallel strategies that do not adhere to the broad principles setout in the CPA (e.g. to make unity attractive).
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE CONTAMINATION PROBLEM
EXTENT OF THE CONTAMINATION
The contamination from landmines and other Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)11 in Sudan
stems from:
a. World War II – resulting in minefields along the northern borders;
b. First Civil War (1955-1972);
c. Second Civil War (1983-2005) – 22 years of fighting between Northern and Southern
Sudan. The main combatants were the Government of Sudan (GoS) military and the
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A). The bulk of mines in the
southern and eastern provinces were laid during this period.
d. Darfur (2003-) – A civil war in Western Sudan creating a major humanitarian crisis,
despite the involvement of African Union peace-keeping troops. So far, there is no
evidence of the use of landmines, but there is a growing ERW problem.
e. Chadian-Sudanese conflict (2005-) – There are also no reports of mine laying, but
fighting will lead to ERW contamination.
f. Fighting among various local militia groups plus inter-ethnic/tribal conflicts have further
complicated the picture, as has the ongoing incursion of the Ugandan rebel group, the
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), into the south-western part of Sudan, which has also led
to limited landmine and ERW contamination on the Ugandan border.12
The major contamination problem stems from the second civil war, which was a guerrilla conflict
with the government holding towns and SPLA controlling the countryside. The GoS used antipersonnel landmines to protect its garrison towns and to interdict the movement of SPLA
supplies and forces. On the other side, SPLA used landmines to block government forces in the
10

The CPA explicitly called for assistance of peace support missions in the area of mine action,
and this is reflected in the Security Council Resolution
11
ERW includes unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned ordnance (AXO).
12
The Landmine Monitor (2006) reports alleged use along the borders with Chad, Eritrea, Libya
and Uganda up to 2004.
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towns and to interdict their supply lines by planting anti-vehicle mines on roads. Further, Human
Rights Watch reports that the GoS used landmines in its efforts to control the oil fields in
southern Sudan.13
Twenty-one of Sudan’s 26 states are thought to have a landmine/ERW problem, with
contamination heaviest in the South, where the bulk of the fighting took place in the last NorthSouth civil war. In the North, three main areas have been affected: Southern Kordofan (the Nuba
Mountains) and Blue Nile states, plus the Abyei area – the so-called “Three Transitional Areas”.
In the South and in the Three Transitional Areas, landmine/ERW contaminated areas include
access routes and connection roads between major towns and villages; bridges and major
transport routes to Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Kenya; agricultural
and grazing land; and areas used for firewood and producing charcoal. Contamination prevents
the use of social and economic infrastructure, and impedes socio-economic recovery and
development. In addition, the contamination prevents or delays the return of internally displaced
persons (IDPs) and refugees to their home communities.
The full extent of contamination is not yet determined. By March 2007, the UN Mine Action
Office (UNMAO) has registered dangerous areas (DAs) in seven regions (regions such as Darfur,
Kordofan and Equatoria have more than one state).14
Table 1 – Dangerous areas by region
Region
Bahr El Ghazai
Blue Nile
Darfur
Kassala
Equatoria
Kordofan
Upper Nile
Total

Total number of DA
350
138
53
46
678
543
97
1,905

DA cleared
123
46
44
17
138
355
14
737

DA awaiting clearance
227
92
9
29
540
188
83
1,168

IMPACT OF THE CONTAMINATION
Compared to 2002, the landmine/ERW casualty rate has dropped from over 170 to under 100 in
2006. However, the numbers of recorded victims has actually increased between 2005 and 2006,
and may further increase if accidents continue in 2007 at the current rate. As victim statistics
cannot be considered comprehensive, it is difficult to determine whether more accidents are
occurring, or whether these figures reflect more complete recording.

13

Human Rights Watch interviews with witnesses to casualties caused by government-laid land
mines, Kenya-Sudan border, August 1999
14
All figures from UNMAO IMSMA Monthly Report, March 2007.
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Figure 1 – Landmine/UXO victims recorded by year
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The Survey Action Centre (SAC) got involved in Sudan in June 2003, conducting an Advance
Survey Mission in Southern Kordofan. By October 2007, Landmine Impact Surveys (LIS) had
been completed in seven states: Eastern Equatoria, Blue Nile, Kassala, Red Sea, Gadaref, Sennar
and Northern Bahr el Ghazal (for which results have not yet been published). Based on these
partial results, the contamination problem in most of Sudan appears to be slight to modest.
Table 2 – Summary of LIS Results in Six States
States
Eastern Equatoria
Blue Nile
Kassala, Gadaref,
Red Sea, Sennar

Communities
400
523
1,072

Affected Communities
(% of total)
43 (10.8%)
33 (6.3%)
16 (1.5%)

Pop. Affected (% of
total)
83,000 + 53,000
refugees/IDPs (?%)
55,000 (?%)
61,000 + 20,000
refugees/IDPs (1.6%)

Recent
victims
28
10
20

PROGRESS IN MINE ACTION
Since early 2004, there have been no reports on landmine use in Sudan, which can be considered
a great success stemming from the Government’s adoption of the Anti-personnel Mine Ban
Convention (APMBC) and SPLM’s signing of the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment.15 It also
shows the commitment of both the GoS and SPLM/A to live up to these international
commitments. Unfortunately, this does not mean that the problem is solved, as there remain
conflicts in Sudan.
Of the known 1,905 DAs, over 735 have been verified as safe or cleared since 2002,16 with 3,238
anti-personnel mines, 1,682 anti-vehicle mines, along with hundreds of thousands of small-arms
ammunition rounds and UXO/AXO found. A total of 1,168 DAs are awaiting clearance, of which
a slight majority (656) are suspected minefields. So far, clearance efforts indicate that there are
not large numbers of mines and the perceived threat is far greater than the actual threat.
15

The Geneva Call Deed of Commitment is an instrument committing non-state actors to similar
obligations to those of States Parties to the Ottawa Convention.
16
The majority of the cleared DAs were unexploded ordnance (UXO) or abandoned explosive
ordnance (AXO) rather than minefields (528 UXO spots, 47 ammunition dumps, 43 confrontation
areas and 9 ambush areas, compared to 107 minefields). The clearance of minefields is far more
time consuming than UXO or AXO tasks.
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By August 2007, more than 18,500 kilometres of supply and access routes have been confirmed
safe, with over 1,800 km of roads demined.17 More than 1.7 million Sudanese have received mine
risk education (MRE).
UN MISSION IN SUDAN
UNAMIS & UNMIS
The basis for the current UN Peace Support Operation was laid in July 2004 with the
establishment of the United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS). While the Advance
Mission’s mandate focussed on the development of peace operations in support of a peace
agreement between the Government and the SPLM/A, from the beginning it had to deploy many
of its resources to the continuing crisis in Darfur.
Following the signing of the CPA, the international community established the United Nations
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) via Security Council resolution 1590 on 24 March 2005. The
Mission mandate is to help the people of Sudan promote national reconciliation, lasting peace and
stability, and the protection of all citizens. UNMIS was assigned various tasks to support the
implementation of the CPA, including support for the implementation of the Ceasefire
Agreement and investigations of violations; donor liaison; assistance for DDR programmes and
in restructuring the police services; promotion of the rule of law and human rights; facilitating the
voluntary return of refugees and IDPs, and humanitarian assistance by, inter alia, helping to
establish the necessary security conditions. Within the mandate, UNMIS is to …assist the parties
to the CPA in cooperation with other international partners in the mine action sector, by
providing humanitarian demining assistance, technical advice, and coordination.18
A Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) is mandated to coordinate all activities
of the UN system in Sudan, and to mobilize resources and support from the international
community. As the peace-building process also concerns militias and foreign armed groups (e.g.
Lord’s Resistance Army), which may threaten the peace in Southern Sudan, the Mission has a
force protection mandate, which provides the means to protect UN personnel and facilities and to
ensure the freedom of movement for UN personnel. The military component of UNMIS is headed
by the Force Commander, responsible for the monitoring/verification and Force Protection
functions of the Mission.
The Security Council resolution gave UNMIS a seven-year mandate, broken into four phases:
•
•
•
•

Phase 1: pre-interim period (6 months – starting with the signing of the CPA on 9 Jan
2005);
Phase 2: period up to national elections (3½ years – mid-2008);
Phase 3: period up to the referendum (2½ years – end 2010);
Phase 4: period following the referendum, pre-exit

The overall goal of UNMIS is to serve to make national unity attractive for Sudan, via a three
pillar process:
1. Make peace sustainable;
2. Guarantee human rights of all the people of Sudan;
17
18

Demining includes both survey and clearance.
Sudan Unified Mission Plan, p. 7, www.sudanig.org
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3. Reduce poverty … and lift the standard of living of the poorest segments of society
through good economic governance.
The UNMIS mandate relates primarily to the former North-South conflict, and its operations are
mainly in Southern Sudan and the Three Transitional Areas.19
UNAMID
Until now, the peacekeepers in Darfur have been fielded by the African Union although recently
a UN peacekeeping force has been approved. On 31 July 2007, the UN Security Council
authorised the joint African Union/UN hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID). UNAMID is to
begin implementation no later than 31 December 2007 to support its mandate, as follows:
•
•
•
•

to support the peace process and the good offices of the African Union-United Nations
Joint Special Representative for Darfur;
security
rule of law, governance, and human rights
humanitarian assistance

As part of its security mandate, UNAMID is …to provide technical mine-action advice and
coordination and demining capacity to support the Darfur Peace Agreement.
EVOLUTION OF THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
PRIOR TO THE CPA
Acknowledging the problems of landmine contamination, in 1996 the SPLM/A declared a
unilateral moratorium on the use of landmines, provided the GoS reciprocated. In 1999, GoS and
SPLM/A pledged not to use mines and requested international assistance for the clearance of
landmines. SPLM/A invited international NGOs into the areas of their control to begin mine
clearance.
In 2001, the Sudan Landmine Information and Response Initiative (SLIRI) was created to initiate
cross-line information gathering and to develop plans for mine action.
The 2002 Nuba Mountains Cease Fire Agreement between GoS and SPLM/A established the
international Joint Military Commission (JMC) to monitor the ceasefire and created an
opportunity for safe mine action in Southern Kordofan. In the same year, a Memorandum of
Understanding was signed between the GoS, SPLM, and UNMAS. The ensuing concept plan for
Emergency Mine Action in Sudan established national and regional coordination mechanisms in
Khartoum, the Nuba Mountains, and Rumbek.
JMC had a civil-military coordination (CIMIC) component to promote peace, and the first mine
clearance projects were also launched as peace-building initiatives.20 Deminers were trained from
both north and south to work in the same organisation. Both GoS and SPLM/A showed further
commitment by accepting mine ban obligations. The SPLM signed the Geneva Call Deed of
Commitment in October 2001, while GoS ratified the Convention in October 2003 and this
entered into force on 1 April 2004.
19

The forces component of UNMIS lost its mandate in the East once the SPLA withdrew
following the 2006 peace agreement.
20
The NGOs Danish Church Aid (DCA) and Landmine Action U.K. (LMA) started operations in
the Nuba mountains. LMA worked with SLIRI, while DCA had the national NGO partners
JASMAR from the North and OSIL from the South.
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The Swiss Federation for Mine Action (FSD) route survey teams began operations in February
2004. In collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP) and UNMAS, priority routes for
reconstruction were assessed and DAs identified. The firm Mechem, under contract with
UNOPS, also began survey and clearance of routes in March 2004.
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which had been working in southern Sudan since 1986,
expanded its programme from food security, health care, and other humanitarian/development
components to include mine action in 2004, when sustainable peace seemed in sight.
Also in 2004, GOS, SPLM, and the UN signed the Sudan National Mine Action Strategic
Framework and the Sudan National Mine Action Policy Framework.21 These frameworks stated
that mine action in Sudan would have a “one country approach” covering the period 2005-2011.
These initiatives allowed a flexible mine action response even prior to the signing of the CPA in
early 2005. However, mine action efforts expanded significantly after the signing of the CPA.
MINE ACTION SINCE THE CPA
UNMAO
Chapter VI of the CPA states that UNMIS will assist the Parties’ demining efforts by providing
technical advice and coordination. (This also is reflected in UN Security Council Regulation
1590, which established UNMIS.) According to the UNMIS Unified Mission Plan, UNMAS is
the coordinator of a common UN mine action program, involving the following agencies:22
•
•
•
•
•

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS),23 has a dual role to coordinate UNMAO and
to plan, coordinate, and monitor demining in support of the UNMIS mandate;
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), providing support to national authorities
in building national mine action capacities;
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), undertaking MRE;
World Food Programme (WFP) undertaking clearance of key supply and access routes; and
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) providing mine risk education to
returning refugees and IDP and undertaking clearance of areas required for resettlement of
refugees and IDPs.

The Mission Plan states that mine action will focus on three key areas:
1. Development of a mine action programme, surveying of potentially contaminated area,
clearance of priority areas, victim assistance, and mine risk education.
2. Clearance of priority roads and sites to facilitate the deployment of the military and civilian
police components of the Mission. (This includes Juba airport and UNMIS and other UN
deployment sites.)
3. National capacity building through support to the national mine action authorities and
national NGOs in both the North and the South. This includes the development of national
technical standards.
The Mission Plan also calls for the formulation and implementation of a Transition Plan to …pass
21

These were updated in June 2006 and endorsed by the GoNU Cabinet in Aug 2006.
In addition, UNMIS Peacekeeping contingents include a number of engineering units that have
been trained to demine in accordance with IMAS.
23
UNOPS recruits personnel and procures equipment under contract to UNMAS.
22
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responsibility for management of the UN Mine Action Office to national authorities… and to
develop …fully operational national mine action coordination and implementation capacity.
UNMAS has established the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) in Khartoum, with regional
offices in Juba (controlling sub-offices in Wau and Malakal),24 Kadugli (controlling sub-offices
in Damazin and Kassala), and Al Fashir (controlling Darfur). This decentralised structure is
expensive as it requires many international personnel, but it serves the needs of a large country
with little infrastructure.
UNDP ROLE
UNDP is the lead agency within UNMAO for supporting the development of mine action
capacities. The UNDP project is managed by a Senior Technical Advisor (STA) based in
Khartoum, with a Technical Advisor (TA) in Juba and two national programme officers.
With support from UNDP and UNMAO, the National Mine Action Policy Framework and the
National Mine Action Strategic Framework were updated in June 2006 and approved by the
Council of Ministers (GoNU) that August.25
UNDP has also assisted with coordination for a variety of training activities,26 principally:
•
•

•
•

senior and middle management courses (at James Madison University, Amman, and
Nairobi);
training in humanitarian demining at the International Mine Action Training Centre
(IMATC) in Nairobi for personnel from both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and
SPLA assigned to the Joint Integrated Demining Units (JIDUs – 133 personnel in total),
as well as from the local NGO Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL – 17 persons);27
study tours of other mine action programmes;
attendance at various international mine action meetings.

The UNDP also encouraged the GoNU and GoSS to include mine action in their budgets for the
first time in 2006, and assisted the preparation of GoSS medium-term expenditure plans for mine
action through the ‘budget sector working group’ process.28
Future priorities planned by the UNDP include:
• establishment of a legal framework for national NGOs (to facilitate the involvement
of national NGOs in mine action),
• additional capacity enhancement for staff of the national authorities,
• stockpile destruction,
• support for the six sub-offices, and
• implementation of a victim assistance project.29
24

With improvements in road transportation in the South, sub-offices in Yei and Rumbek were
closed in July 2007.
25
The original Policy and Strategic Frameworks date from August 2004.
26
For the most part, the organizations providing the various training workshops raised their own
funds, so little funding for training has come via the UNDP budget.
27
An additional 140 deminers were undergoing training at IMATC at the time of the evaluation
mission, while 20 persons from the initial course are also being trained as team leaders.
28
This appears to be designed both to establish a medium-term expenditure framework for the
GoSS and to facilitate aid coordination.
29
Funding for the Victim Assistance project comes from Japan via the Human Security Trust
Fund.
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UNDP support to MA is provided mainly under the Human Security and Recovery budget line,
included in multi-year project (USD 120 million/per year, of which approximately USD 1 million
is budgeted for mine action).
NATIONAL ORGANS
The CPA specifies the establishment of Northern and Southern demining authorities that are to
coordinate their activities in close cooperation with UNMAO. In the North, the National Mine
Action Authority (NMAA) was established 24 December 2005 through Presidential Decree No.
299 and officially launched on 07 March 2006. The National Authority comprises:
•
•
•
•

The High National Committee for Mine Action
The General Secretariat30
The National Centre for Mine Action (NMAC) under a Director General31
The Southern Sudan Regional Mine Action Centre32

The NMAC is based in the same building as the UNMAO, and reports to the State Minister of
Humanitarian Affairs who in turn reports to an inter-ministerial committee under the lead of the
Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence.
In the South, the New Sudan Mine Action Directorate (NSMAD) was formally established in
Juba33 in 2005. It was also collocated with the UNMAO Regional Office. NSMAD existed in
name only, with little capacity to conduct coordination or mine action planning. In June 2006,
NSMAD was re-named to Southern Sudan Demining Authority (generally termed the Southern
Sudan Demining Commission – SSDC), through the GoSS Presidential Decree No. 45. As well in
2006, the Transport and Demining Steering Committee was established in Southern Sudan to
agree mine action priorities. It is chaired by the Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator and is
said to work effectively.
The institutional and organisational make-up for mine action in the North is excellent, at least on
paper. There is a clear separation between the policy and oversight roles of the High
Committee,34 supported by a secretariat, and the policy-implementation responsibilities of the
Mine Action Centre. The list of responsibilities set for the different organs are well thought out.
Unfortunately, the institutional and organisational make-up for mine action in the South remains
incomplete. Only a five-person demining authority was established by presidential decree.
However, the SSDC has engaged approximately 40 staff and opened three sub-offices, and seems
intent on assuming many functions that should be discharged by a mine action centre – a body
30

The State Minister for the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs serves as the General Secretary to
the High Committee. Together, the High Committee and its General Secretariat would constitute
the ‘national authority’ according to IMAS definitions.
31
Although formally both the Higher Committee and the NMAC are part of the ‘Authority’, it is
clear that the Higher Committee (supported by its General Secretariat) is responsible for policy
and strategy, and for supervising the work of the NMAC in implementing those policies and
strategies. Thus, following IMAS definitions, the Higher Committee is the ‘National Authority’ and
the NMAC is a separate ‘National Mine Action Centre’. See IMAS 02.10, Guide for the
establishment of a mine action programme.
32
Technically, a mine action centre in the South does not exist; instead, a Southern Sudan Mine
Action Commission (SSDC) has been established. This distinction is discussed later in the report.
33
Having been relocated from Nairobi where it had been since its formation in 2002.
34
This comprises representatives from 12 national ministries, from the GoSS, from the armed
forces (GoS, SPLA, and JIUs), and from civil society.
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distinct from and reporting to an authority. Fortunately, the presidential decree states that the
SSDC is to work with the Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development to prepare
draft legislation for mine action in South Sudan. This will allow the shortcomings in the
institutional and organisational make-up to be addressed.
OTHER MINE ACTION ACTORS
The main operating partners for mine action remain the international NGOs (often in cooperation
with national NGOs) and commercial contractors, along with demining contingents in both the
UNMIS Peacekeeping Forces and the local militaries.
Table 3 – Principal demining operators in Sudan
Firms
Armour Group
MECHEM
Mine Tech
Ronco
TDI
Local militaries 

International NGOs
DCA
DDG
MAG
NPA

Local NGOs
FPDO
JASMAR
NMMAS
OSIL
SLIRI/SLADO/SLR

UNMIS Forces
Bangladesh
Cambodia
Egypt
Kenya
Pakistan

JIDUs, plus SAF and SPLA

UNMAO has not only taken on a coordinating role, but it also administers and supervises
contracts35 for the tasks identified as priorities by Steering Committees.36 In addition, UNMAO
coordinates the tasking of the demining assets of the Troop Contributing Countries.
WFP also issues contracts for survey and road clearance.37 Coordination between WFP and
UNMAO has generally been sound (at least when WFP has a mine action advisor on staff), and
criteria for setting priorities for road work are clear: (i) opening access to Uganda and Kenya and
(ii) supporting IDP/refugee return through regional centres and then smaller communities.
FUNDING
Mine action in Sudan has been well resourced, particularly since the CPA. Total funding rose to
over $40 million in 2005, and perhaps $60 million per year since then. More than half the total
funding has come via the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) assessed budget,
which is used for mine action in support of the UNMIS peacekeeping forces. Significant amounts
also have been channelled by donor countries through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine
Action (VTF), which covers other UNMIS priorities (e.g. to support humanitarian assistance).
Other international funds have gone to:
•

the WFP for demining services in support of its road rehabilitation programme38

35

Technically, UNOPS issues the contracts on behalf of DPKO/UNMAS.
The bulk of mine action funding has come from the assessed budget for UNMIS, and covers
the UNMIS ‘forces mission’. The UN Voluntary Trust Fund for mine action covers humanitarian
priorities of the mission. The Steering Committees comprise representatives of UNMIS, the UN
Country Team, and the Sudanese Governments.
37
On signing of the CPA, WFP switched all efforts to road repair and reconstruction to reduce
costs. Since 2002/3 WFP has reduced the percentage of airlifted food from 80% to under 7%.
This demining project is a component of a larger road construction programme, running from
2004 – 2008.
38
The WFP road programme appears to have become part of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund
(MDTF) mechanism. Under the general arrangements for the MDTF, two-thirds of funding for
each project should come from the governments of Sudan, with the remainder covered by the
Trust Fund itself. The WFP budget for demining is $12 million.
36
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•
•
•

directly from donors to international NGOs for demining, MRE, and victim assistance
directly from donors to Cranfield University to run mine action training courses
directly from donors for training and equipping of the JIDUs

In addition, the UNDP has received EUR 50 million from the European Community for the
Community Based Relief and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP), to be implemented by NGO
consortia. Grants totalling EUR 10.7 million have been awarded to two consortia which include
international and local mine action NGOs to provide support to the other consortia members that
are working in mine-affected communities.
The World Bank administered Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTF) had budgeted $5 million for
demining in support of the Emergency Transport and Rehabilitation Project. These funds have
not yet been drawn upon, and there is some question whether they will, in fact, be utilised (this is
discussed later in the report).
In addition to these international contributions, both the GoNU and the GoSS have significantly
increased their funding to mine action. The governments are paying for the staff in the NMAC
and SSDC, and the deployment costs of the JIDUs. Although the evaluation team was not able to
obtain precise figures for mine action expenditures to date, the GoSS has budgeted $2.5 million
for the SSDC for both 2008 and 2009.
CURRENT PRIORITIES
The programme’s overall objectives as outlined in the Mine Action Strategic Framework, and
referred to in the JAM Volume II report (pages 245 ff.) include continued implementation of
demining and MRE priorities, plus:
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Completion of the Landmine Impact Survey
Strengthening and expanding national capacities for victim assistance
Capacity development, including:
o Strengthening and expanding the national mine action institutional framework
for planning, coordination, and monitoring all activities
o Strengthening and expanding national capacities for operations (survey;
clearance; MRE; victim assistance)
Developing and implementing a transition plan to transfer responsibilities from UN
agencies to national authorities
Mainstreaming mine action into national recovery & development plans
Mobilising adequate resources to achieve the strategic goals, and
Ensuring Sudan meets its Treaty obligations.

In its 2007 Work Plan, UNMAO defines its priorities for mine action as:
HUMANITARIAN PRIORITIES
• Assessment and clearance of priority roads to facilitate mission and humanitarian
operations, and the safe movement of population;
• Conduct survey, marking of dangerous areas, and the clearance of minefields and ERW
contaminated areas in high impacted communities in support of mission and
humanitarian activities;
• Provide targeted MRE to IDPs, refugees and mine/UXO affected communities to reduce
the risk from landmines and ERW; and
• providing Landmine Safety briefings to UN and aid agency personnel.
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RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES
• Development of national mine action institutions and capabilities;
• Strengthen and expand the existing national capacities for physical rehabilitation and
socio-economic reintegration of mine survivors;
• Destruction of stockpiles of anti-personnel mines.
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Table 4 – Timeline of Mine Action in Sudan
Date
1996
1997 Dec
1998
1999

2000
2001

General context

GOS & SPLM/A pledge not to use landmines & request international assistance for
mine action
SPLM/A invites INGOs for demining
Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement
GoS/SPLA cooperation

2002

Jul
Sep

2003

Aug
Oct
Nov

2004
Mar

Aug

Mine Action Programme
UNDP/Capacity Development
SPLA moratorium on use of landmines
GoS signs Ottawa Convention

Sudan Landmine Information and
Response Initiative (SLIRI) created to
initiate cross-line information gathering
and to develop plans for mine action
SPLM signs Geneva Call Deed of Commitment

Framework peace established
MoU between GoS, SPLM/A, & UNMAS for the Emergency Mine Action Programme
National Mine Action Office of the GoS established
New Sudan Mine Action Directorate (SPLM/A) established in Nairobi
SPLM/A signs Geneva Call Deed of Commitment
GoS ratifies Ottawa Convention
Cross line operations begun, allowing
movement of deminers for humanitarian
demining
UN deploys UN Advance Mission in
Sudan (UNAMIS),
Route survey & clearance begins.
UNDP STA arrives in Khartoum
UNMAS initiates limited route verification
and clearance
Regional EMAP sub-office established in
Rumbek, South Sudan
Initial version of National Mine Action Strategic Framework adopted
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Date
2005 Jan
Mar

General context
Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Security Council Resolution 1590
Sudan Unified Mission Plan

Oct

Dec
2006
Mar
Jun
Aug

2008
2009
2010
2011

UNDP/Capacity Development

New Sudan Mine Action Directorate moves from Nairobi to Juba
New UNDP STA for Mine Action arrives in
Khartoum (7 month delay)
UNDP Support to National Mine Action
Capacity Development plan revised
Members of Joint Integrated Units trained
on basic demining in IMATC
GoNU establishes National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) by Presidential Order 34/2005
GoNU establishes National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) by Presidential Decree No.
299/2005
Southern Sudan De-mining Authority established by Presidential Decree 45/2000
National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) officially launched
GoNU & GoSS include funds for mine action within their budgets
National Mine Action Policy Framework and National Mine Action Strategic Framework
(2006-2011) passed by GoNU legislature

Sep

2007

Mine Action Programme

Mar
Oct

UNMAS Evaluation
Evaluation of UNDP Mine Action Project
UNMAS engages transition planning officer

mid

Elections due

end
mid

Referendum scheduled
UNMIS mandate ends
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CURRENT ISSUES CONCERNING THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
UNMAO & UNMAS
UNMAO continues to act as the de facto mine action centre for Sudan. Perhaps 80% of all
international funding for mine action flows through UNMAS for UNMAO, with about half of the
total international funding goes for demining support for the peacekeeping forces. UNMAS plays
the dominant roles in UNMAO.
Table 5 – Estimated annual funding for mine action in Sudan
Source of funding
Assessed peacekeeping budget
VTF & other grants to UNMAO
Direct to NGOs
Direct grants to WFP

Agency
UNMAS
UNMAS (mainly)
International NGOs
WFP

Approximate amount/yr (% of total)
$30 million (48%)
$20 million (32%)
$10 million (16%)
$2.5 million (4%)

Broadly, UNMAS has two main responsibilities:39
1. performing the mine action centre functions in support of UNMIS peacekeeping forces and
police contingents (covered by the peacekeeping assessed budget), and other UNMIS
components (i.e. ‘humanitarian’– covered by the VTF and direct grants from donors);
2. providing support for national mine action authorities (including capacity development).
Experience elsewhere has shown that the effective discharge of such a dual role is difficult.40
Understandably in such situations, staff tend to focus firstly on their direct responsibilities, and
only secondly on supporting counterparts in local organisations. This ‘operations bias’ is
particularly pronounced in fields such as mine action when the failure to get the work done in the
field could result in human casualties and the disruption of essential operations (peacekeeping;
humanitarian).
Another common challenge is that the people hired on the basis of their abilities to perform a job
may not have the skills and aptitudes needed to train and mentor a counterpart. An additional
issue in Sudan is that the scope of UNMAS responsibilities in support of UNMIS has represented
a daunting challenge, particularly during the start-up of such a large and geographically dispersed
programme in a difficult environment, leaving less time for support to the NMAC and SSDC.
Capacity development also requires more than training. Local counterparts need the opportunity
to apply, on-the-job, what they have learnt in workshops and study tours. In Sudan however,
UNMAS has direct responsibility for tasks in support of UNMIS, and cannot transfer these
responsibilities to local counterparts. As the majority of demining tasks are still in support of
UNMIS (or fall to international NGOs or firms working to support WFP, UNHCR, etc.), there
have been comparatively few opportunities to put NMAC and SSDC personnel in charge of the
task cycle, with UNMAS personnel playing an advisory role.
In situations such as Sudan, where UNMAS has a direct management role, a further complication
is that responsibilities for supporting capacity development are split within the UN. UNDP is
39

These are explicitly mandated responsibilities. UNMAO may also support development
priorities using the VTF or grants directly from donor countries.
40
See, for example, Eaton et al, 1997, The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities,
UN DHA.
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designated as the lead UN agency with respect to supporting capacity development,41 but the bulk
of the skilled and experienced personnel who could train, advise, and mentor local counterparts
are UNMAS staff.42 In Sudan, for example, there are only two international mine action TAs for
UNDP, compared to perhaps 50 for UNMAS. Thus, while UNDP may be in a position to assist
local authorities in defining their capacity development requirements, planning how to develop
those capacities, and implementing certain components of the capacity development plan (e.g.
training workshops; study tours), the UNDP TAs depend on UNMAS personnel to provide
capacity development support on a day-to-day basis.
This dilemma cannot simply be ‘solved’ once and for all – it has to be managed through effective
planning and coordination. As yet however, the essential plans and coordination mechanisms are
not fully in place. On the one hand, there is no medium- to long-term plan for mine action in
Sudan. UNMAO prepares only annual plans, focussed principally on operational priorities for the
coming year. The Policy Framework and Strategic Framework adopted by Sudanese authorities43
is an important achievement, but does not paint a clear picture of the likely contamination
problem that Sudanese authorities will have to deal with following the UNMIS mandate. Because
of this, the capacities required to deal with this contamination cannot be defined and, as a result,
the appropriate strategy for developing these capacities cannot be determined.
As well, there has not been an adequate overall coordination mechanism for mine action in
Sudan. On paper, there is a Steering Committee chaired by the DSRSG, but this has not met in
over a year. Recently however, the Secretary General of the NMAA convened a meeting of
Sudanese mine action authorities and UN agencies to initiate the process of transition planning.
From this, the GoNU has agreed to a broader Steering Committee (government/UN/donor) to
meet alternatively in Khartoum and Juba.44
OTHER INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION ORGANISATIONS
Coordination between UNMAO and demining firms is straightforward as this is covered by
commercial contracts. Cooperation between UNMAO and international mine action NGOs also
appears to be good. Although the INGOs get much of their funding directly from donors, there
are regular meetings in Juba for all mine action organisations (chaired by SSDC and facilitated by
UNMAO), and the INGOs attend most of these. The INGOs also report that they obtain task
dossiers from UNMAO,45 and they report regularly on their activities to both UNMAO and
SSDC. The NGOs also work closely with government mine action authorities – particularly in the
South where most demining operations take place. Most report that their relations with both
UNMAO and government mine action authorities are good and have improved over the past year.
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES
In the absence of a long-term strategy based on a realistic assessment of the likely contamination
the governments will have to address following the departure of UNMIS, Sudanese mine action
41

UNMAS, 2005, Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Inter-Agency
Policy. As well, UNICEF is the lead UN agency with respect to MRE.
42
Formally, they are engaged by UNOPS on behalf of UNMAS.
43
At the time of the mission, it had been endorsed by the GoNU cabinet. The GoSS had
concerns about language that seemed to give the NMAA oversight responsibility over the SSDC,
but we understand that a clarification had been proposed that satisfied the GoSS.
44
See letters of 29 August and 25 September 2007 from the State Minister of Humanitarian
Affairs on mine action transition planning.
45
Generally, the NGOs do not simply adopt UNMAO priorities as they are working for specific
clients (e.g. DDG for UNHCR) or have adopted a distinct strategy from UNMAO (e.g. NPA
focuses on demining for agriculture; MAG focuses on UXO).
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officials appear to lack a realistic picture of what their capacity requirements are. In the absence
of such a picture, it is natural that they look to UNMAO and international NGOs as models.
Thus, Sudanese mine action authorities appear to envisage a large programme with a number of
operating partners (JIDUs and perhaps other military units; local NGOs; perhaps other types of
organisation) working under the direction of the two MACs (which will also handle quality
assurance). Accordingly, the two MACs46 have hired fairly large number of personnel (perhaps
40 each) and have opened a number of sub-offices (often collocated with UNMAO sub-offices).
This concern was well encapsulated by the evaluation team commissioned recently by UNMAS:
The result is that there has been little effective effort to manage the expectations of the national
bodies, which seem to be trying to duplicate the current size and structure of the UNMAO.
JIDUs
The first cohort of the JIDUs received their training in IMAS-compliant mine clearance in 2006.
However, the units were never accredited by UNMAO before they began demining operations in
advance of reconstruction of the 446 km Babanusa-Wau railway line.47 This key North-South
transportation link is a high priority for both GoNU and GoSS, and $32 million was allocated for
its rehabilitation in the MDTF-funded Emergency Transportation and Rehabilitation Project.
Accordingly, UNMAS planned to issue a commercial tender for demining in 2006.48
However, the GoNU decided that the cost and time estimates from UNMAS were excessive,49
and agreed with the GoSS to assign the JIDUs to this task. The GoNU procured approximately $1
million in heavy equipment required by the JIDUs, and paid for their deployment.50 Sudanese
authorities report that the task took one month preparation and four months to complete, and cost
substantially less than the estimate provided by UNMAS.51 UNMAO did not quality assure the
work, but the GoNU accepted liability.52
Following a request for assistance from the governor of Kassala, the JIDUs are now working on
the clearance of roads in that state. Again, this assignment was made outside the joint prioritysetting mechanisms established by UNMAO and the Sudanese governments. As such, the JIDUs
are not tasked by UNMAO and their work is not quality-assured by UNMAS.
The Evaluation Team was advised that the Sudanese governments plans to use the JIDUs to
provide demining support for roads to be reconstructed by the Emergency Transport and
Rehabilitation Project, funded through the MDTF. Approximately $5 million (all from
international donors) had been included in the project budget for demining support but – based on
46

The SSDC is legally constituted as the ‘authority’, but is referred to as the ‘commission’ and is
trying to develop capacities that would normally reside in a mine action centre.
47
Accreditation of a Demining organization requires a review of its Standing Operating
Procedures (SOPs) and of all its equipment – as well as the training received by its personnel –
to ensure all these are compliant with IMAS.
48
It planned a general assessment followed by clearance of identified DAs to 15 meters each
side of the centre line, plus clearance of all road-rail crossings, railway stations, and rail bridges.
49
Under the MDTF agreements, the governments in Sudan would pay for two-thirds of all MDTFfunded projects. The Babanusa-Wau railway was budgeted at $32 million, but the governments
would accrue two-thirds of any cost savings.
50
The JIDUs were supported by military engineers from the SAF and SPLA, who identified where
they had planted landmines.
51
The cost figures provided by the GoNU do not include all cost elements, such as depreciation
of equipment.
52
It could do this because the reconstruction work was to be done by the state-owned Sudan
Railway Corporation.
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the experience on the Babanusa-Wau railway – the GoNU has advised the World Bank that all
demining would be done by ‘national assets’ (i.e. the JIDUs), with the government providing a
certificate that the demining shall be done to international standards.
This approach could lead to serious problems and cause significant delay to the relevant
components of the Emergency Transport and Rehabilitation Project. The first problem relates to
liability and insurance. Unlike the Babanusa-Wau railway, which is being implemented by the
state-owned Sudanese Railway Corporation (allowing the GoNU to absorb all liability) the road
reconstruction contracts are to be awarded following World Bank rules for international
competitive bidding. These rules require, among other items, that the prime contractors have
adequate insurance coverage. In areas where explosives contamination is suspected, international
insurance companies will require that demining support is provided by accredited operators in
accordance to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). At the present time, the JIDUs are
not accredited by a body that is technically capable of accrediting demining operators.53 If
insurance firms are aware of this, it is unlikely they will agree to insure against risks related to
explosives contamination. If they are unaware of the situation and provide insurance, it is
possible that they would refuse to pay should a problem arise from explosives contamination. It is
unclear whether the World Bank would even proceed with a tender in such a situation.
The second problem relates to project management and cost-effectiveness. Based on experience
in other countries, best practice is for the tender documents to specify that prospective prime
contractors for road/rail reconstruction in mine-affected areas be required to include in their bids
an accredited demining operator as a sub-contractor. The winning prime contractor would then
manage and accept responsibility for the work of the demining sub-contractor.54 Thus, should
there be a missed device leading to an accident or work stoppage, the prime contractor (and its
insurer) bears the responsibility, rather than the government. This often leads to cost savings on
the entire reconstruction project, even though the costs of demining may be higher. Experience
from other countries shows that work delays caused by missed incidents often cost more than the
demining services themselves, so trying to save money on demining services alone (e.g. for
Sudan, by using the JIDUs as a government contribution) may be self-defeating.
Textbox 2 – Demining for Road & Rail Reconstruction: lessons from Mozambique
Roads – The National Administration for Roads (ANE) first encountered serious problems with
landmine and UXO contamination during its Emergency Road Programme (1994-96). Under
intense time pressure, it worked with UNDP and donors to make arrangements for stand-alone
demining services – typically mechanical ‘treatment’ followed by survey and clearance – so as
not to delay the work of the civil engineering firms selected as prime contractors for each
rehabilitation project. This proved extremely unsatisfactory, as many explosive devices were
*
missed, causing the road work to stop, with the ANE bearing the cost of delays.
As a result, ANE has developed a system whereby the prime contractor assumes complete
responsibility for demining services. Tender documents make it clear that the bidders must
include an accredited sub-contractor for demining. After the award of contract, the prime
53

The GoNU has the legal right to provide an accreditation certificate, but it is unlikely that
international insurance companies would recognise this as being IMAS compliant. Accreditation
involves, in the main, assessing that all equipment is IMAS compliant, that all personnel
(deminers; medics; etc.) are trained to IMAS standards, and that the organisation’s Standing
Operating Procedures (SOP) are IMAS compliant. NMAC personnel have not yet developed the
expertise required to conduct such an accreditation exercise, and it is not clear to the evaluation
team that the JIDUs have even developed a complete set of SOP.
54
In most countries, the work by the demining operators would also be quality assured by the
national MAC, which would still issue clearance certificates.
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contractor is not allowed to mobilise the road works crews until the demining sub-contractor
produces a certificate from the national mine action authority that the roads, bridges, gravel pits,
and other worksites relating to the roads rehabilitation project have been cleared. Subsequently,
any missed devices incidents are the responsibility of the prime contractor.
Railways – In contrast, the failure to integrate demining into reconstruction proved extremely
costly in the case of the Sena railway line – a vital development initiative for Mozambique which,
among other things, opens access to the large Moatize coal mine. The World Bank financed
($130 million) a major public-private project in which Mozambique’s state railway corporation
(CFM) reconstructed the railway as a prelude to a major investment in rail stock by a consortium
of Indian firms that would manage rail operations. Demining had been done by MineTech (1998)
and RONCO (2001). When the World Bank conducted its environmental impact studies relating
to the upgrading of the Sena line, it advised that clearance would be required to at least 15
metres from the centre line and, ideally, to 25 metres. However, the Bank did not incorporate
funds for demining into its loan or the financing plan for the project, leaving this cost to be
covered by CFM. CFM sought assistance from the U.S. State Department, which provided
funding to Ronco to conduct demining again.
Unfortunately, once the rail reconstruction was completed, an employee of the Indian railway
consortium was killed when he stepped on a landmine in a ‘cleared’ area. The Indian rail
consortium demanded that the rail line be re-surveyed before resuming its work.
* In some cases, the ANE suspects that roads contractors planted mines themselves in order to justify work
stoppages (i.e. they were delayed for other reasons, so created a “missed device incident” to justify a work
stoppage and shift the cost of the delay onto ANE).
Sources: GICHD, 2005, A Review of Ten Years Assistance to Mine Action in Mozambique. Agencia de
Informacau de Mocambique, 28 Sep 2006, Mozambique: Sena Line Declared Free of Land Mines.

Apart from the problems that could arise on road reconstruction programmes, which are so vital
to Sudan’s development prospects, having the JIDUs work outside of the scope of UNMAO
could lead to a number of problems or lost opportunities, including:
•
•
•
•
•

the loss of a single, definitive source of information on landmine and other ERW
contamination and demining work;
greater difficulty for national mine action authorities in establishing and enforcing the
principle that all demining in Sudan shall be IMAS-compliant;
lack of certainty on the part of development agencies and future investors concerning the
safety of an area ‘cleared’, but not to IMAS standards;
The need to demine some areas again at a future date to ensure the work has been done to
IMAS-standards;
the failure to recognise that the JIDUs have the capacity to work to international
standards.

PRIORITY SETTING
The assignment of the JIDUs to the Babanusa-Wau Railway task is the clearest indication that
differences are emerging between the priorities identified by the governments and by UNMAO.55
Joint priority-setting mechanisms have, in fact, been established in both the North and South,56
and these meet regularly. The governments compile priorities from the state governors, sector
55

All parties recognized that the railway was an important task, but the governments gave priority
to cost and speed rather than to IMAS compliance.
56
In the South, this is the Transport and Demining Steering Committee. The Committee is
chaired by the Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and comprises UN agencies, UNMIS,
the Ministry of Transport and the SSDC.
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ministries, etc. while UNMAO focuses on UNMIS priorities (peacekeeping forces, plus UNMIS
humanitarian priorities).
There appears to be agreement on the majority of the task priorities, which is not surprising as the
opening of major roads is viewed as an essential by both government and UN authorities.
However, government authorities – particularly in the South – expressed some frustrations to the
evaluation team. From the examples they cited, it appears there are two frustrations:
Table 6 – Emerging frustrations regarding priorities
Expressed Frustration
Some tasks are demined even though
these are far down on the SSDC list of
priorities
Some tasks that the GoSS has indicated
as development priorities do not get on
the final list of demining priorities (e.g.
irrigated agricultural land in Awil and a
sugarcane plantation in Maloot)

Underlying Reason
These are tasks required by UNMIS peacekeeping
forces. As almost half of all mine action funds are
earmarked for demining support of UNMIS
peacekeeping forces, these tasks are done.
The GoSS is not in a position to implement the
development project in the current year, and UNMAO
does not have multi-year plans so these tasks cannot
be listed as priorities in future years.

In some cases, SSDC has approached one of the demining NGOs to undertake a task that the
GoSS considers to be a development priority, but which UNMAO is unable to demine.
The problems arising from different priority ‘orderings’ for UNMAO and government authorities
appears to be modest at the present time, suggesting (i) that many tasks are common priorities
and (ii) that the regular meetings between government authorities and UNMAO are effective in
maintaining cordial relations. However, the divergence between UNMIS and national priorities is
likely to increase over time:
•
•

as local authorities launch additional development initiatives that do not overlap with
UNMIS security or humanitarian mandates; and
as the most obvious common priorities (primary roads, etc.) are addressed.

Figure 2 – Diverging priorities?
 increasing divergence over time 

UNMAO
priorities
Common
priorities
GoNU/
GoSS
priorities
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UNMAO has effective mechanisms for funding and QA of its priorities (which include the
common priorities). However, a solution is not yet in place for funding and QA of those
GoNU/GoSS priorities which are not shared by UNMAO.
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ANALYSIS OF THE UNDP PROJECT
KEY RELATIONSHIPS
UNDP IN SUDAN
UNDP plays a number of roles (i) within UNMIS, (ii) as a UN agency with long-standing
involvement in Sudan (which will continue after the UNMIS mandate ends), and (iii) as the lead
among UN agencies with respect to a number of programming areas that are critical in Sudan,
such as capacity development, governance, and ‘early recovery’.
Within UNMIS, one of the two Deputy Special Representatives to the Secretary General
(DSRSG) combines humanitarian and development functions by uniting the functions of UN
Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative with those of Humanitarian
Coordinator. The intent is to coordinate all multilateral aid to Sudan through the DSRSG for
Development and Humanitarian Affairs. However, the DSRSG then must manage a huge amount
of humanitarian aid while, at the same time, gradually introducing development assistance.
The UNDP also serves as the administrator of the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) and, as
such, must provide financial management and operational services to the Humanitarian
Coordinator, other UN agencies, and donors. This has been a significant burden given the amount
of humanitarian activity in Sudan and, unsurprisingly, affects the level of administrative support
available to smaller programmes, such as the support to capacity development for mine action.
Outside the UNMIS mandate, until last year the legal basis for UNDP work was its Country
Cooperation Framework: 2002-2006 (CCF). However, the signing of the CPA, the establishment
of UNMIS, and the massive international assistance ($4.5 billion) pledged at the Oslo Donors
Conference made it necessary to make substantial revisions to the CCF. This was accomplished
by means of a Bridging Programme for 2007-2008, with three broad programme areas:57
1. Fostering Democratic Governance and Rule of Law
2. Promote Human Security and Recovery
3. Human Poverty reduction and progress towards the MDGs
Mine action falls under Human Security and Recovery, along with (in the human security
‘cluster’) Security Sector Reform; Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR);
Community Security; and (under recovery) livelihood restoration; sustainable natural resource
management; and capacity building for conflict resolution. Human security is an appropriate
cluster for mine action, which has links both to the other human security programmes and to
recovery (e.g. the large Community Based Relief and Rehabilitation Programme – RRP – which
is managed by UNDP). The senior UNDP personnel responsible for Human Security and
Recovery programming appear to be well informed concerning mine action and its importance in
Sudan (including its contributions to peace-building in advance of the CPA).
In its role as the lead UN agency in early recovery situations, the UNDP is taking a lead role in
the development of the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for 2009-12. This
work is well advanced, and is organized around four themes:
•

Peace-building;

57

There are also cross-cutting issues: capacity development; gender; environment; HIV/AIDS;
and conflict transformation/prevention.
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•
•
•

Governance, rule of law, and capacity building;
Livelihoods and productive sectors; and
Basic services.

Mine Action is being addressed under the peace-building theme, along with DDR. This appears
reasonable, although some attention will need to be given to ensure that appropriate links are
forged with the livelihoods thematic group, as the focus of mine action will shift over time to
livelihoods support in remote communities.
UNDP has provided just over $987,000 from its Mine Action Thematic Trust Fund for its mine
action project in Sudan.58
UNMAO, UNDP, AND OTHER UN AGENCIES
In a number of earlier situations where the UN has been called upon to mount a major
peacekeeping mission, there have been coordination difficulties among the various UN agencies
that play a role in mine action. The UN has attempted to overcome such problems via a UN InterAgency Policy (Mine Action and Effective Coordination) and Strategy (United Nations InterAgency Mine Action Strategy: 2006-2010).59 Building on the policy, the UN established an
integrated mine action office – UNMAO – as part of UNMIS to bring the three components of
the mine action programme in Sudan (Emergency Mine Action, Support to Peacekeeping
Operations, and Capacity Building) under one UN coordination body. UNMAO is led by
UNMAS and incorporates technical advisors from UNDP and UNICEF. At various times, WFP
and UNHCR have engaged mine action advisors to liaise with UNMAO.
UNMAS plays the central role within UNMAO. It fields the UNMAO Director (in Khartoum)
and the Deputy Director (based in Juba).60 The bulk of funding for mine action in Sudan is
channelled through UNMAO for support of UNMIS forces (financed by the DPKO assessed
budget for peacekeeping) and the UNMIS humanitarian mandate (financed principally by the UN
Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Action). UNMAO takes the lead in preparing annual mine action
plans and in implementing those plans (largely via contracts with demining firms and NGOs). It
also provides coordination services61 with:
•
•
•

international mine action NGOs for their work that is funded directly by donors or other
UN agencies (e.g. UNHCR)
firms or NGOs providing demining services in support of the WFP road rehabilitation
programme
government mine action organs

UNMAO is also the de facto authority in Sudan with respect to quality management, including
the accreditation of operators and quality assurance of demining operations.62 In addition,
UNMAO maintains the mine action information management system.
Both UNDP and UNICEF have technical advisors housed in UNMAO Khartoum responsible for
58

UNDP Sudan Strategic Framework for the Bridging Programme: 2007-08, p. 17.
The Policy outlines common ‘positions’ and the specific roles and responsibilities of the various
agencies. The Strategy provides the overall goal and four strategic objectives, together with the
activities to achieve these objectives and performance indicators.
60
Technically, UNMAO personnel are contracted by UNOPS on behalf of UNMAO.
61
Principally, these relate to information exchange rather than direction, and seem to work well.
62
For QA, UNMAO focuses on the firms and NGOs that it has contracted (via UNOPS) rather
than the international NGOs working with direct funding from bilateral donors, UNHCR, etc.
59
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capacity development and MRE respectively. UNDP also has an international advisor based at
the SSDC, who also spends time at UNDP and the UNMAO office in Juba,63 while UNMAS has
engaged regional MRE Coordinators for both the North and South, whose work is coordinated by
the UNICEF MRE officer.
UNDP has also engaged an advisor for victim assistance,64 who is housed at UNMAO,
Khartoum. This work is supported by a grant from the Japanese-funded UN Human Security
Trust Fund (which also covers some of the MRE costs).
Neither the WFP or UNHCR have personnel housed within UNMAO to facilitate coordination of
mine action support to their respective programmes. Coordination between UNMAO/UNMAS
and WFP has apparently been good when the WFP has had a mine action advisor on staff, but
problematic at other times (see textbox). Apparently, coordination with UNHCR has been
adequate since 2006 when it engaged DDG for MRE, survey, and EOD tasks – essentially, DDG
serves as the link between UNHCR and UNMAO.65
Textbox 3 – Demining roads in emergencies
Sudan is an excellent example of the tensions that arise concerning the demining of roads in the
immediate post-conflict period. Peacekeeping forces and humanitarian agencies, as well as
residents and returning refugees, need road access as quickly as possible. The standard practice
that has evolved since the early 1990s is to engage specialised assets* to conduct rapid
verification surveys (i.e. to verify whether there is a risk of contamination) and, where necessary,
demining of road surfaces – in Sudan’s case, to a width of eight metres. If a danger area (DA) is
encountered, it is ‘breeched’ rather than entirely cleared.
However, the rehabilitation/reconstruction of roads and bridges requires demining of much wider
areas (typically, 25-35 metres from the centre line) to allow safe access for construction
equipment and personnel. As road rehabilitation for bulk delivery of food and other humanitarian
aid often begins shortly after the cessation of hostilities, it is important to coordinate all
verification and demining work on roads to prevent needless duplication of effort. As well, it is
critical that all DAs encountered during the verification/demining of road surfaces be marked and
accurately recorded, so these data are available to subsequent road rehabilitation/reconstruction
projects.
* There is no IMAS that explicitly covers the survey and clearance of roads and other infrastructure networks
(‘linear’ rather than ‘area’ demining), and there is no agreement on what type of assets and procedures are
most suitable in different situations. Typically, various mechanical devices and vehicle-based survey assets
are employed, including Remote Explosive Scent Tracing (REST), wide-area detection systems (WADS),
etc. These are expensive and require sophisticated quality management and logistical support systems.
Because of this, international firms or NGOs are engaged to import the specialised assets and carry-out the
work, often with little concern over developing sustainable local capacities as such sophisticated capacities
are difficult to develop and may not be required for the long-term.

It is unsurprising that the creation of UNMAO has not fully eliminated tensions among UN
agencies involved in mine action, or even among those agencies with personnel working within
UNMAO. The various agencies have different mandates, partners/clients, planning horizons, and
so on. On paper, there is an inter-agency steering committee chaired by the SRSG66 to resolve
63

This position was vacant at the time of the evaluation mission.
Again, this individual has been contracted via UNOPS.
65
Gomer et al, 2007, Evaluation of the Mine Action Programme in Sudan for the United Nations
Mine Action Service.
66
The Director of Mine Action provides Secretariat services, and other members are UNDP,
WFP, UNICEF, the Deputy SRSG, the UNMIS Director of Administration, and the Force
Commander.
64

EVALUATION OF THE UNDP SUDAN MINE ACTION CAPACITY BUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
FINAL 12.02.2008 | 26

tensions that invariably arise, but this has not met in over a year. However, the government/
UN/donor Steering Committee recently convened by the Secretary General of the NMAA to
initiate the transition planning process may overcome this deficiency.
UNMAS commissioned an evaluation of the Mine Action Programme in Sudan in early 2007.
(The report is not in the public domain but a copy of it was made available to the evaluation team
on a confidential basis.) The relevant conclusions and recommendations are discussed in the next
section.
MINE ACTION AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT
THE UNDP ROLE
In line with the UN Inter-Agency Policy, UNDP is the lead agency for national capacity building
within UNMAO. Its principal goal is to support the development of national mine action capacity
to coordinate and implement all mine action related activities to address the humanitarian and
development challenges in the Sudan in the long term. To achieve this goal, this project provides
management and technical support to the concerned national mine action authorities to enable
them to establish an institutional framework (legislation, standards, organs, etc.), with a network
of decentralized organizational structures across the country, capable of coordinating, planning,
prioritizing, quality manage, monitoring and implementing all aspects of mine action in Sudan in
line with international standards.
UNDP also works with NMAA, NMAC, SSDC and other government bodies to include mine
action into the broader development agenda. It has also provided support to government
authorities and civil society organizations to ensure that landmine survivors are provided with
rehabilitation and reintegration services.
Under the overall supervision of the UNDP Sudan Country Director, the project uses the Direct
Execution (DEX) modality, managed by the UNDP Senior Technical Advisor for Mine Action
within the UNDP Human Security and Recovery Unit. UNDP also has an international Technical
Advisor based in Juba and two Senior National Officers, one based in Khartoum and one based in
Juba. Under DEX rules, the project management team is responsible for ensuring the application of
the UNDP guidelines (programme, finance, and personnel) and related policies. The project team
also coordinates activities with the New York based UNDP/BCPR mine action team and with other
components of UNMAO.
The line ministry responsible for this project within the GoNU is the Ministry of Humanitarian
Affairs, with most matters handled by the secretariat of the National Mine Action Authority
(NMAA). Within the GoSS, the Office of Presidential Affairs is the responsible department. The key
implementing partners/counterparts of this project are the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)
and the Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC).
UNDP plans for mine action capacity development envisaged the following sequence:67
1. Getting the basic legislative framework in place to establish the national organs (i.e.
mine action authorities and centres) and policy;
2. Getting the national organs housed, staffed and equipped, and training managers in their
basic functions;
3. Supporting the development of operational capacities (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.).

67

Adapted from UNDP Mine Action Capacity Development Presentation, October 2007.
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The principal achievements68 in the realm of capacity development are:69
•
•
•
•
•

•

•

•
•
•

Establishment of the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and National Mine Action
Centre (NMAC, as well as the Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC);
Development and endorsement by both GoNU and GoSS of the National Mine Action Policy
Framework and National Mine Action Strategic Framework for 2006-2011;
Incorporation of mine action in the GoNU and GoSS budgets;
Establishment of the head offices of NMAC and SSDC and six field offices, with defined
organizational structures, offices, equipment (vehicles, computers, and furniture);
Training about 45 staff members of NMAC and SSDC in middle management (in Amman,
Jordan) and eight senior national staff members in senior management (at James Madison
University, USA);
Two mine action exchange missions (Jordan, Bosnia and Herzegovina) with the participation
of two State Ministers to review issues related to legislative and institutional frameworks;
planning and prioritization processes; quality assurance; national coordination mechanisms;
the ‘tool box’ of mine action assets; donor relations/resources mobilization; and transition
from UN management to national management);
Participation of GoNU and GoSS officials in several official key mine action
meetings/workshops including the States Parties Meetings, and Inter-sessional Committees
Meetings from 2004-07;
Training and field deployment of 133 national deminers (JIDUs), plus 17 from OSIL (a local
NGO);
Preparation of a draft Mine Action Law at the level of the GoNU;
Establishment of a facility to support community level micro-projects for the rehabilitation
and socio economic re-integration of landmine victims/survivors (part of a joint UNDP,
UNMAS, and UNICEF project financed by the Human Security Trust Fund).

UNDP has also provided technical assistance to the National Authority on Prosthetics and
Orthotics (NAPO) in resource mobilisation and in meeting Sudan’s obligations under the Nairobi
Action Plan.
Two points should be highlighted. First, the UNDP project team facilitated, but did not finance
from its budget, most of the training, study tours, and participation at international mine action
events. The UNDP project has had a modest budget,70 most of which has been spent on the
project team (TAs plus two national programme officers) and procurement of vehicles,
computers, and furnishings for the NMAC and SSDC offices and sub-offices. Second, the pace of
capacity development accelerated after the establishment of the NMAC and SSDC and the
adoption of the National Mine Action Strategic Framework in August 2006.
THE UNMAS ROLE
One of the principal responsibilities falling to UNMAO is support to capacity development.
UNMAS is the lead agency within UNMAO and so bears some responsibility even though (in
line with the UN Inter-Agency Policy) UNDP has the lead role for supporting capacity
development.
68

It is local authorities, organizations, and individuals who develop capacity – agencies such as
the UNDP can only support local actors in their capacity development efforts. As such, it is
difficult to attribute capacity development outcomes – good or bad – to the supporting agency.
69
This list is derived from the Terms of Reference.
70
Less than $2 million for the period 2004-06. The budget for 2007 was $4.7 million, but only
$2.1 million was received or pledged.
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The UNMAS evaluation took place in early 2007. It concluded that capacity development was
the biggest weakness in the programme and recommended that the UNDP TAs should work
within the UNMAO structure and have ‘a reporting line’ to the Director of Mine Action or to the
appropriate senior manager within the UNMAO. Subsequently, UNDP-Sudan senior
management wrote to express concerns with the UNMAS evaluation, including that:
•
•
•
•

senior management of the UNDP Country Office was not officially informed about the
evaluation, nor consulted during the exercise;
the UNMAS evaluation team did not consult with senior officials of the GoNU
government;
the report was not officially shared with senior management of the UNDP Country
Office or with senior national mine action authorities for comments/feedback; and
the report makes recommendations that are not in line with the mandates and policies of
individual UN agencies (e.g. having UNDP TAs reporting to the UNMAS Director of
Mine Action within UNMAO).

This skirmish appears to be part of a wider controversy within the UN system concerning how
best to achieve what some have termed a ‘joined-up approach’ in peacekeeping situations (see
textbox).
Textbox 4 – Mine Action: ‘unified’ or ‘integrated’
Following the establishment of UNMIS by Security Council Resolution 1590, the UN prepared the
Sudan Unified Mission Plan, which contained the following principles to govern the unified
approach of the UN system in Sudan:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

One shared objective
Common assumptions and parameters
Responsibility to consult
Responsibility to collaborate
Responsibility to maximize shared resources
Common decision making
(p. 13)

At the same time, the Plan emphasised that …the actual peace support operation will not
physically absorb the agencies, funds, and programmes organized in the UN Country
Team (p. 12). This echoes the following statement in the 31 January 2005 Report of the
Secretary-General to the Security Council, which led to Security Council Resolution 1590:
This unified approach would not alter the traditional relationship between the mission’s activities
and the work of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. Such bodies would continue to
implement their respective mandates in the Sudan within an overall and agreed framework
developed under the leadership of my Special Representative. A clear distinction would be
maintained between the coordinating role of the mission and the implementation responsibilities
of agencies, funds and programmes. (S/2005/57, p. 10)
Thus, the ‘unified mission’ does not imply a unified command-and-control structure but rather a
common approach based on a shared objective, common assumptions (e.g. on needs), and
common decision-making.
More recently, the ‘capstone’ document on UN Peacekeeping Operations states that …integrated
planning allows the United Nations system to maximize the impact of its engagement in countries
emerging from conflict by ensuring that its activities are guided by a common strategic vision.
However, integration does not mean that all United Nations actors on the ground should be
physically integrated or subsumed under a single structure. Moreover, while the members of the
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UNCT come under the overall authority of the SRSG/HOM, in reality, they are governed by
mandates, decisionmaking structures and funding arrangements that are quite distinct from those
of the United Nations peacekeeping operation. As a result, integration among the members of the
broader United Nations family cannot simply be imposed by edict from above, and can only be
achieved through a constant process of dialogue and negotiation between the actors concerned.
UN DPKO, Jan 2008, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, p. 43)
A distinction between ‘unified’ and ‘integrated’ also appears to have evolved within the UN
system in Sudan. The Evaluation Team has not come across any reference that clarifies the
distinction in definitive terms, but – in practice – the distinctions seem to be as follows:

Command-andcontrol

Resource
mobilization

Accountability

Unified
Staff appointed by UN agencies to
a unified office still report to line
managers within their parent
agencies, but coordinate activities
within the unified office/programme
Resources are mobilized separately
by each UN agency

Each UN agency represented in a
unified office reports directly to its
donors

Integrated
Staff appointed by each UN agency
to an integrated office managing a
programme report to the manager
of the integrated office
Resources are mobilized jointly and
pooled, based on project plans
which are prepared by the
integrated office.
Reports to donors are submitted by
the integrated office on behalf of all
the participating UN agencies.

The DDR programme has been managed as an integrated programme by the Integrated UN
DDR Unit. This programme has been criticised for slow progress caused, in part, by
disagreements among the participating UN agencies on the appropriate strategy. For example:
…tensions emerged between the DPKO and UNDP over the best way forward. The UNMIS
DPKO contingent endorsed the conventional top-down approach prescribed by the CPA. UNDP –
together with a number of local organisations – advocated for an alternative model that…
emphasised local and participatory approaches to defining ‘community security needs’, and
supported ‘development’ incentives in exchange for voluntary disarmament. UN policy makers
and practitioners admit that, despite their best intentions, very little has been achieved over the
past two years… (Robert Muggah, Great expectations: (dis)integrated DDR in Sudan and Haiti,
Humanitarian Practice Network, www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2878)
Of course, one should not conclude that the difficulties experienced in the DDR effort, which has
its own unique challenges, implies that an integrated approach should not be adopted for Mine
Action. Indeed, in September 2005, the Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan stated: In
addition to general coordination between the UNMIS military component, United Nations
agencies and national and local authorities, the United Nations Mine Action Office, in cooperation
with UNDP, facilitated dialogue between the two national mine action authorities to ensure
continuation of the integrated and unified mine action programme in the Sudan and long-term
capacity-building. (S/2005/579, 12 September 2005, p. 14 – emphasis added.) In this context
however, the phrase ‘integrated and unified mine action programme’ appears to refer to the ‘one
country’ approach agreed for Sudan’s mine action programme as far back as the initial Mine
Action Strategic Framework and Policy Framework adopted in 2004.
However, the problems experienced by the UN DDR programme do suggest that an integrated
approach does not, by itself, overcome deep-rooted differences between agencies concerning
the correct strategy. As well, it is unclear that the mine action programme has fully adhered to the
principles outlined in the unified mission plan. The most obvious problem has been the failure to
hold regular meetings of the Steering Committee for UN Mine Action, chaired by the DSRSG.
This would be the obvious mechanism for implementing ‘common decision-making’.
More generally, a means has to be found to address the underlying tension in strategic approach
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between DPKO units (whose mandate stems from the time-bound peacekeeping mission) and
agencies such as UNDP, which have long-term development mandates. The obvious means to
grapple with these differences in planning horizons is a multi-year plan – one with a duration long
enough to incorporate both the developmental objectives (including capacity development) and
the shorter-term requirements of the mission. Crafting a multi-year plan is not an easy task, but in
the absence of such a plan it is hard to see how either a unified or an integrated programme will
achieve short-term requirements while at the same time promoting long-term development.

Concerns over progress have also been expressed by the governments of Sudan.71 These,
however, have been discussed in the context of the ‘transitional plan’ which was specified as a
goal in the Mine Action Strategic Framework, to be developed and endorsed by December 2006.
Of course, ‘transition’ and ‘capacity development’ are complementary and, in the case at hand,
should be seen as two sides of the same coin – the successful transfer of any responsibility from
the UN to national actors is predicated on the capacity of national actors to discharge that
responsibility. But at the same time, ‘transition’ and ‘capacity development’ are not precisely the
same thing, and it is important to maintain the distinction to avoid confusion. For example:
•
•

there are UNMAO responsibilities that will not be transferred to national authorities –
most obviously, mine action support to UNMIS;
national authorities already have many capacities relating to mine action that UNMAO
does not have and cannot transfer, such as:
o status as a State Party to the Ottawa Convention;
o ‘organic’ connections with other government departments and levels (states, etc.)
to facilitate the incorporation of mine action within development plans;
o access to the public treasury via annual and supplemental budget processes.

As well, although both ‘transition’ and ‘capacity development’ should be seen as joint
responsibilities of UNMAO and the Sudanese governments, UNMAO will be taking the lead role
in formulating the transitions plan72 while responsibility for capacity development planning rests
first-and-foremost with the governments.
ROLES OF INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION NGOs IN CAPACITY BUILDING
In addition to the mine action services they provide, international NGOs have played a significant
role in supporting the development of local capacities for mine action. As in most mine-affected
countries, this is most obvious at the level of individual capacities – hundreds of Sudanese are
trained and are working as deminers, medics, team leaders, MRE instructors, etc.
Support from INGOs in the development of capable local organisations has been somewhat less
successful. Local NGOs such as JASMAR, FPDO, and OSIL are playing significant roles in
MRE, victim assistance, and in conducting the Landmine Impact Survey. But for demining –
where the technical and financial demands are far greater – progress has been slower (again, this
is consistent with the experience in other mine-affected countries). Regardless, some INGOs
seem committed to supporting the capacities of their local NGO partners for demining.
In a number of mine-affected countries (BiH, Cambodia, Ethiopia), NPA has taken the strategic
71

See especially the letter on Development and Implementation of a Mine Action Transition Plan
from the State Minister for Humanitarian Affairs, dated 28 Aug 2007.
72
We have no view on whether this should be the norm. But in the case of Sudan it seems
appropriate. UNMAO has responsibilities to support UNMIS that it cannot transfer to national
authorities, so will need to plan and manage the transition in such a way to protect its own
capacity to discharge those responsibilities.
EVALUATION OF THE UNDP SUDAN MINE ACTION CAPACITY BUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
FINAL 12.02.2008 | 31

choice to support the capacities of national mine action centres. NPA has stated its interest in
playing a similar role in Sudan – for example, it would be willing to second some of its most
experienced local staff to a Southern Sudan MAC once one is created.73
UNDP COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN SUPPORTING CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT
The report from the evaluation commissioned by UNMAS in early 2007 concluded that capacity
development was the biggest weakness of the mine action programme in Sudan and
recommended that the UNDP TAs should have a ‘reporting line’ to the Director of Mine Action
in UNMAO. This suggests the UNDP TAs should answer to, and take direction from, the
UNMAO Director for at least some of their responsibilities. The report did not, however, specify
precisely how responsibilities should be split between UNMAO and the UNDP Country Office.
It is unclear that such a shift in reporting relationships is either necessary or warranted to promote
mine action capacity development in Sudan. First, most of the people met on our mission stated
that (i) mine action has made much greater progress than other programmes such as DDR, and
(ii) progress in capacity development has accelerated since mid-2006, when the NMAC and
SSDC were formally established.
More fundamentally, the principal responsibility for capacity development lies with national
authorities and not with UN agencies, which can only advise on the capacities required and the
strategies for developing these, and then support what Sudanese governments and mine action
officials have determined they will do. Thus, the unique role for UNDP assistance should be in
advising and supporting Sudanese governments and mine action officials in the development and
implementation of their capacity development plans for mine action. In this role, the UNDP has a
number of comparative advantages vis-à-vis UNMAS, including:
•

•

•

•
•

long-term relationship – local capacities are needed for the long term challenge of
addressing Sudan’s explosives contamination problem. UNDP has a long-term
relationship with the governments of Sudan, whereas the UNMAS involvement stems
from the UNMIS mandate, which will expire in 2011;
development mandate – while mine action is in Sudan is now supporting humanitarian
and peacekeeping programmes, it will shift to a development focus over time (see
textbox). UNDP has a development mandate, whereas UNMAS does not;74
lack of a mandate to support UNMIS operations – there are unavoidable tensions arising
between UNMAS (which has a distinct operational mandate from the Security Council)
and the Sudanese governments, which want to allocate resources to their own priorities.
UNDP does not have a mandate to undertake mine action operations and can focus on
advice and support to Sudanese governments in their capacity development efforts;
good relationship with governments – By all accounts, the UNDP mine action team has
established very good relations with both the GoNU and GoSS authorities;
the ability of the UNDP STA to function in Arabic – this has been important in dealings
with the GoNU.

73

NPA does not consider the SSDC to be a MAC and believes – correctly in the view of the
Evaluation Team – that a MAC should be distinct from the authority.
74
UNMAS can, of course, provide mine action services in support of development (rather than
peacekeeping or humanitarian) activities. However, UNDP’s core mandate is development its
mine action activities follow from this. The reverse is true with UNMAS, where the core mandate
is mine action.
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Textbox 5 – The Mine Action Programme Life Cycle
Transitions from conflict – Countries that are successful in recovering from internal conflict
go through a number of transitions, from conflict through post-conflict stabilisation (including,
in some cases, peacekeeping and internationally-supervised elections), reconstruction on a
*
‘campaign’ basis and, finally, to traditional development.
This description of the recovery is a stylised one as the transition from conflict to development
is uncertain, prone to reversals, and may evolve differently in various parts of the country. But
the dynamics of such transitions is significant for mine action programmes. In particular:
• the country’s political and socio-economic environment will evolve, often quite rapidly
• the size and importance of the different international assistance programmes –
humanitarian, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction, and development – will
evolve over time and, because of this…
• the international actors present in the country, their primary objectives, and their
relative powers to influence the development agenda will also evolve.
The mine action programme life cycle – The principal outputs of mine action (safe land;
people aware of the dangers posed by landmines; etc.) are simply means to an end.
Therefore, mine action should focus most of its resources in support of the most strategically
important efforts underway in the country at any point in time. Thus, mine action priorities
should shift from a humanitarian focus, through support for internal security/peacekeeping
operations, then support to the priority reconstruction programme, and finally alignment with
‘normal’ development priorities. Typically these will be relative shifts over time rather than
abrupt changes and there will be periods when mine action is supporting multiple objectives.
When broken down in this manner, the pattern of mine action expenditures over time in a
country might appear as depicted below.
Peace
1st elections
2nd elections

$

Mine Action for
Internal Security

Mine Action for
Reconstruction

Mine Action for
Development

Humanitarian Mine Action

0
Stabilization
Conflict
(Emergency aid)

Priority Reconstruction

Development

Increasing government ownership 
Change will be occurring on three additional dimensions. First, national governments will exert
increasing ownership over the development agenda. Second, the capacity of the mine action
programme will grow. Finally, mine action managers will be able to make more informed
decisions as they have more and better data on:
• hazards (locations, types of devices, assets the hazards are blocking, etc.);
• livelihoods and essential livelihoods assets of the affected communities;
• national governance – government formation and its machinery for functioning;
• international aid and government financing — the key actors and their principal
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objectives at national, regional, and community levels.
Some of the main implications for mine action managers are summarised in the table below.
This aims to describe general trends, but the specific circumstances of individual countries will
lead to variances (sometimes substantial) from this picture.
Need/Type of
programming
Humanitarian

Key actors

Likely degree of
coordination

•
•
•

UN agencies
Red Cross
INGOs

Low

Internal
security

•
•

UN agencies
Peace-keeping
forces

High

Reconstruction

• World Bank +
regional DB
• Major donors
(showcase
projects)
• Government
• World Bank +
regional DB
• Lead donors in
each sector

Development

Fairly high

• High if government committed +
capable
• Low if government capable but
not committed
• Medium
otherwise

Typical challenges for mine
action
Dealing with many agencies which
may disagree on priorities +
strategies in a complex, rapidly
changing environment.
• Balancing military, humanitarian, reconstruction priorities
• Security of staff
• Cooperation with militaries
• Large scale demining tasks
under tight deadlines in support of
major re-construction projects
• Ensuring funds for demining are
included in reconstruction projects.
• Coordinating with many local,
provincial, + national officials on
task priorities
• With committed governments,
coordination with key budget +
planning units to ensure adequate
priority for mine action
• Without committed government,
coordination with donors

Implications – When developing their strategic plans, mine action managers need to be
aware that their principal challenges and partners may well be different in five years’ time.
They need to anticipate what changes are likely and determine what steps they need to take
today so the programme is well positioned to meet tomorrow’s priorities.
* Post-conflict reconstruction programmes are often organised on a ‘campaign’ basis to unify commandand-control and to pool resources, rather than through the normal work procedures of donors and

the local government.
Adapted from GICHD, 2004, A Guide to Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action Planning
and Management, www.gichd.org
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CONCLUSIONS
Mine action has made important contributions to broader processes and programmes in Sudan,
including:
• Peace-building in the lead-up to the CPA and in its aftermath;
• The return of displaced peoples and the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
• The restoration of internal security and the expansion of secure areas.
Mine action has been an important point of entry for constructive engagement by the
international community in Sudan.
Mine action is one of the fields in which the GoNU and GoSS cooperate most effectively with
one another, and with the international community.
In most areas of Sudan, contamination is a modest problem, but the fear of landmines remains a
significant constraint to recovery and development efforts.
UNMAO has established an effective programme in a very challenging environment.
International NGOs have also established significant mine action capacities within Sudan.
Cooperation among mine action actors is generally good, and has been improving.
Both Sudanese governments have made significant moves towards establishing national
capacities to coordinate and implement mine action programmes.
There is no clear vision of the future make-up and workings of the mine action programme in
Sudan (i.e. post-UNMIS).
There is no long term plan in place that clarifies what type of mine action capacities will be
required following the departure of UNMIS, and how to build those capacities.
The direct operational mandate of UNMAO could complicate the full development of national
capacities for planning, coordination, and quality management.
Specific irritants have emerged which, if unaddressed, could further complicate the relations
between UNMAO and the national authorities and their ability to formulate a common vision and
long-term strategy.
The fact that the JIDUs are engaging in demining for infrastructure reconstruction without being
accredited in a manner compliant with IMAS could have serious repercussions for the major
infrastructure projects to be funded by the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, which would, in turn,
seriously delay development in much of the country.
UNDP assistance has helped the Sudanese governments to put in place the basic building blocks
of a national mine action programme, with (for the most part) a sound institutional and
organisational make-up.
UNMAO partners have provided significant training for the staffs of the national mine action
organs, but these personnel must be given the opportunity to apply what they have learned,
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particularly in discharging the core functions of mine action centres – quality management
(national standards, accreditation, quality assurance/control); operations planning and
tasking/contracting; information management.
UNDP has not yet focussed sufficient attention on helping Sudanese authorities to formulate their
own strategic plans based on:
• a clear assessment of the likely mine action needs following the departure of UNMIS,
and
• clear decisions on the strategy for developing the national capacities that will be required
to meet those needs.
The UNDP country management team appears to recognise the contributions made by mine
action, the continuing need for mine action in Sudan, and the requirement for continued UNDP
efforts to assist national authorities in developing the capacities needed to plan and manage a
national programme.
There appears to be insufficient attention to the need to involve donors in the process of
formulating a common strategy for mine action in Sudan.
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THE WAY FORWARD
THE NEED FOR A STRATEGIC PLAN AND PLANNING PROCESS
There is an urgent need for a long-term strategic plan for mine action in Sudan that addresses
what will be required after the departure of UNMIS. Such a plan should be developed by the
governments with the assistance of UNMAO and, in particular, the UNDP. To be meaningful,
such a strategy needs to be endorsed by all main stakeholders (UN agencies; donors; INGOs;
national operators) and to be consistent with the transition plan for transferring responsibilities
from UNMAO to national authorities and centres.
DEFINING AND AGREEING UPON FUTURE NEEDS
A commonly endorsed strategic plan must be based on a needs assessment that is accepted by all
stakeholders. Therefore, the starting point in the planning process is a thorough discussion of the
explosives contamination problems that Sudanese authorities are likely to face following the
UNMIS mandate. The various survey processes are sufficiently advanced to provide a reasonable
assessment of Sudan’s explosives contamination problem. As well, UNMAO has the capacity to
prepare a reasonably accurate forecast of the progress that will be achieved in the coming years
and, therefore, the contamination that will remain after mid-2011. In broad terms, UNMAO
believes it will:
• open all roads for use;
• mitigate contamination in all communities with high- or medium-impacted LIS scores;
• clear 90% of the DAs along roads.
Textbox 6 – Essential features of strategic plans for mine action
There are many types of strategic plans, but the word ‘strategic’ implies certain essential
features, including, for mine action programmes:
• The logic underpinning the plan is how to achieve a desired outcome in the future rather
than a forecast of what will be achieved given the current structure and momentum of the
programme (although such a forecast will be necessary to assess what changes to the
programme will be required to achieve the desired outcome)
• In focusing on the future outcome, the plan addresses not only the internal dynamics of
the programme, but also on the broader political, social, and economic features that will
make the future different than today;
• The plan incorporates ‘hard decisions’ – in this case for example, there will be a number
of alternative strategies for developing the local capacities to plan and implement the
continuing mine action programme, and the strategy should be clear that certain
alternatives will be supported, while others are not;
• The plan addresses a number of inter-related decisions in an integrated fashion so it is
internally consistent – for example, there must be internal consistency among (i) the set
of mine action problems/needs, (ii) the planned operational capacities to meet those
diverse needs, and (iii) the mechanisms to coordinate and monitor the operators.

To provide an adequate basis for a strategic plan, forecasts must be made not only of the extent of
the likely contamination that will remain in 2011, but also of:
• its nature (e.g. minefields; scattered landmines; UXO; AXO; etc.);
• location (including whether it is accessible or remote);
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•
•

socio-economic impacts (including whether it is a current problem or whether it will
become a problem in the future); and
reconstruction and development programmes that may be constrained by explosives
contamination and which, therefore, will require mine action support.

As well, provision must be made for the fact that surveys are dependent largely on information
from local residents, and that the contamination picture will remain incomplete in areas where the
population has not returned and resumed their livelihoods. In addition, as communities grow and
prosper, their economic footprints will expand, which may bring residents into contact with
previously unknown contamination hazards. Thus, new reports of contamination hazards will
emerge over time, and this needs to be considered when determining future capacity
requirements.
AGREEING ON CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS
The needs assessment will then provide a basis for discussions concerning:
•
•
•

What capacities? The types and quantities of assets and skills that will be required to
address the different categories of contamination;
Capacities for whom? The types of mine action organisations (military, police, nonuniformed public sector, NGO, commercial) that should house the capacities, and;
How to coordinate the capacities? How those assets will be coordinated and
monitored/quality assured.

The current UNMAO ‘business model’ is based on commercial contracting of assets over a
specified period, with the assets then being assigned to specific tasks by UNMAO. For this model
to be fully effective, independent monitoring is required of both the quality and productivity of
the various demining operators. There are alternative business models that may be more
appropriate for different types of contamination. For example:
•

•

•

normally, demining support for major reconstruction of infrastructure networks (roads,
power lines, etc.) is best managed by making the prime contractor responsible for the
demining (i.e. by sub-contracting an accredited demining operator and assuming
responsibility for that operator’s work);
normally, demining of small tasks in remote locations cannot be monitored effectively by
mine action centres (particularly when EOD teams respond to community requests), so is
best delivered by accredited government or NGO operators with a public service (rather
than a commercial) mandate75 (the international demining NGOs are already operating on
this basis with respect to EOD tasks);
mine action support for small-scale reconstruction and development work appears to be
best managed by having the development NGOs or programmes coordinate the mine
action operators (as appears to be the case for the two RRP consortia that incorporate
mine action);76

75

The essential issue is that the funding arrangements should not be based principally on the
completion of specific tasks, which strengthens incentives to maximize productivity but also to cut
corners, misreport achievements, and conduct unnecessary clearance.
76
A problem that has been experienced with such arrangements in other countries is that the
development organisations are risk-averse and may demand clearance of areas that probably do
not contain explosive contamination – better, however, to sacrifice some demining efficiency
rather than developmental effectiveness.
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•

mine action in support for commercial projects (oil drilling; oil and gas pipelines;
mining; commercial farming; etc.) is best managed by having the investor engage
specialised demining firms. These firms should, however, be accredited by national
authorities and be required to report on hazards discovered, survey and clearance work
completed, etc.

Thus, there are alternative approaches for developing the needed demining capacities (which
could be commercial; civilian public sector; defence and/or police forces; local NGOs;
international NGOs), and for coordinating the demining organisations (e.g. central tasking with
fixed-price contracting, cost-plus contracting, or straightforward grants; community-based
planning and priority-setting; rapid response by decentralised operators, etc.). Each alternative
has strengths and weaknesses, which need to be assessed relative to the challenges inherent in the
different types of demining tasks (e.g. for infrastructure; large minefields; remote, small tasks;
etc.). Thus, a core element of the strategic plan will be the identification of what types of
capacities should be developed, within which kind of organisations. Implicitly, this means
decisions on which capacities/organisations should not be supported.
Textbox 7 – Lessons learnt or dogma: the basic structure of a mine action programme
Ever since the 1997 report on building indigenous mine action capacities,* the international mine
action community has advocated the following basic structure for the key organs of a national
mine action programme:
•

•
•

an inter-ministerial committee to function as the national mine action authority,
responsible for broad policy and oversight (reporting through a designated minister to the
government as a whole)**
a national mine action centre responsible for planning, coordinating, and monitoring
operations, and for quality management
independent operators – public service units, firms, NGOs, etc. that are independent of
either the authority or the MAC and which provide the actual mine action services
(demining, MRE, survivor assistance).

Are these recommendations backed by evidence? Not all are. Some of the most effective
national mine action programmes in the world have the operational mine action capacities
incorporated into the national mine action centre (e.g. EMAO in Ethiopia; YEMAC in Yemen).
However, the failure to put in place an effective inter-ministerial committee to function as the
national mine action authority and to hold the MAC to account for performance appears to be a
recipe for performance problems, even if operators are independent of the MAC (e.g. Angola and
Mozambique, where there is no effective national authority for mine action).
* Eaton et al, 1997, The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities
** Unfortunately, the Evaluation of the Mine Action Programme in Sudan has this muddled, conflating the
cabinet with the national mine action authority (and calling this a ‘governing council’) and then having a
‘national regulatory authority’ responsible for the typical MAC functions. See especially Annex III.

A MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK
The strategic plan should be formulated by the Sudanese governments with the support of
UNMAO partners and in consultation with other key stakeholders (donors, international
demining NGOs, etc.), as the Sudanese governments will be seeking the support of these
stakeholders in achieving the planned outcomes. At the end of the process, the strategic plan
should be endorsed by all stakeholders wishing to remain active in mine action in Sudan. The
agreed contributions from, and roles to be played by each stakeholder should be clearly noted.
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The last essential element of the strategic planning process is agreement on a monitoring and
evaluation (M & E) framework that will:
•
•
•

monitor progress towards the achievement of planned results;
monitor the extent to which different stakeholders have delivered on their agreed
contributions to the strategic plan (i.e. a mutual accountability framework);
monitor whether the critical assumptions on which the strategic plan is based are holding
true – should it become clear that a critical assumption is untrue, the plan will need to be
modified or abandoned.

PLANS-STRATEGIC, CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT, AND TRANSITION
Objective #6 of the Strategic Framework specifies that UNMAO and the NMAA shall jointly
develop, endorse, and implement a transitional plan to facilitate the transition of mine action
management from the UN to the national mine action authorities.77 Subsequent to the evaluation
mission, UNMAS has engaged an officer responsible for transition planning. Meanwhile, the
report from the recent evaluation commissioned by UNMAS recommended that UNMAS, UNDP
and UNICEF need to make a concerted effort to address the issue of capacity building and to
develop a joint plan with planned activities, milestones and outputs that is commensurate with the
residual mine problem in the country in 2011. (p. 44)
Thus, there are existing recommendations to formulate a ‘transitional plan’ and a ‘capacity
building plan’, while we are recommending a ‘strategic plan’ for the national mine action
programme. What are the differences?
We see the central need is for the governments of Sudan to put forward a strategic plan – that is, a
clear vision of what mine action will look like after the end of the UNMIS mandate, based on a
clear assessment of the likely scope and nature of the remaining contamination problem and on
strategic decisions concerning what capacities will be required in what types of organisation. This
should be done with the advice of UNMAS and other UNMAO partners, but must not be done by
UNMAS/UNMAO as this would be an abrogation of national responsibility for addressing
Sudan’s contamination problem, would inhibit continued growth in national ownership, and
would leave it unclear whether Sudanese authorities were truly committed to the ‘hard decisions’
on which any useful strategic plan is based.
Once the strategic decisions are made by Sudanese governments concerning the quantity and
types of mine action capacities needed for the long-term in Sudan, along with which
organisations will house these various capacities, an adequate framework exists for:
•

A proper capacity development plan specifying how and when the needed mine action
capacities will be developed in the selected organisations.78 Once again, the capacity
development plan should be formulated by the governments of Sudan and not by the UN
agencies within UNMAO as, in the long term, it is the governments that will be
responsible for supporting and managing these mine action capacities. However, the

77

The original schedule was for the transition plan to be completed by December 2006. In August
2007, the Secretary-General of the National Mine Action Committee wrote to UNMAO and UNDP
to initiate the transition planning process, which led to a meeting in early October.
78
Needless to say, in the absence of these fundamental strategic decisions, the framework for a
capacity development plan can never be entirely adequate.
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various UN agencies – and particularly UNMAS – will need to provide support to
Sudanese capacity development efforts.79
Therefore, the ‘joint capacity building plan’ referred to in the report from the UNMAScommissioned evaluation should be a document from the governments and not from
UNMAS, UNDP, and UNICEF: rather, each of these UN agencies should have its plan
for supporting Sudanese capacity development efforts.
•

Transition planning – the sequenced transfer of UN responsibilities and assets to the
appropriate Sudanese organisations.
As the successful transfer of UN responsibilities will depend largely on the capacity of
the organisations assuming those responsibilities, the transition plan needs to be tightly
linked to both the national capacity development plan and to the capacity development
support plans of the various UN agencies.

Therefore, the strategic plan provides the essential framework for both a capacity development
plan (which could even be a chapter of the strategic plan) and a transition plan.
Table 7 – Medium/long-term plans required
Sudanese plans
UNMAO plans
Transition Plan
Strategic Plan provides the framework for 
and for 
Capacity Development Plans (GoNU; GoSS)
Capacity Development Support Plans
provides the framework for 
(UNMAS; UNDP; UNICEF)
and for 
Capacity Development Support Plans of International NGOs (NPA etc.), specialised mine action
organisations (e.g. Cranfield University), etc.

Recommendation 1 – The UNDP and its UNMAO partners should encourage Sudanese
authorities to launch a process to prepare a long-term strategic plan for Sudan’s mine action
programme. This plan would be based on a thorough analysis of the likely need for mine action
services after the end of the UNMIS mandate, clarify what mine action capabilities will be
required, and specify the types of organisations that will deliver the various mine action services.
Recommendation 2 – UNMAO partners should assist Sudanese authorities in preparing their
strategic plan, which should also incorporate input from national and international mine action
NGOs, donors, and other stakeholders.
Recommendation 3 – The UNDP and the UNMAO Transitions Planning Officer should assist
Sudanese authorities in formulating their medium-term and annual plans – based on the strategic
plan – for developing the mine action capacities the country will require by the end of the
UNMIS mandate.80 These plans should be synchronised with the UNMAO Transitions Plan for
79

NPA has also stated that it would be willing to support capacity development of a MAC in
Southern Sudan should one be established (i.e. NPA does not consider the SSDA to be a MAC).
80
The draft IMAS 02.10 – Guide for the establishment of a mine action programme – provides
excellent advice concerning the roles, responsibilities, and capacity requirements of a mine
action programme, including the national organs (i.e. the authority and MAC). Available from
http://www.mineactionstandards.org/imas.htm
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transferring responsibilities to Sudanese authorities, set clear objectives and dates for achieving
these, and specify what specific actions or contributions are expected from which agencies
(Sudanese, UN, international NGO, etc.).
ROLE OF UNDP
At the present time, the chief value-added of the UNDP in mine action would be assisting the
Sudanese governments in formulating their strategic and capacity development plans. A key
aspect of this would be facilitating the process of consultations with mine action stakeholders –
other UN agencies, local and international mine action NGOs, and donors. This contribution
would be consistent with the UN Inter-Agency Policy for Mine Action and its mandate within the
UNMAO, and with the UNDP comparative advantage vis-à-vis other international mine action
organisations present in Sudan.
Textbox 8 – Capacity development in post-conflict or fragile states
Mine action practitioners frequently find themselves in situations where the government lacks
capacity, commitment, or both. In these situations, it generally is easier and less risky to ‘do the
work for them’ (e.g. by using international NGOs or firms to provide demining services) rather
than investing in local organisations which may – initially at least – be slower, less accountable,
more prone to collapse, etc. And how does one even start when one’s counterparts may not have
the capacity to plan how to develop the capacities that will be needed in the long-term? This, in
particular, is the situation that UNDP TAs often find themselves in, because the organisation has
a mandate focusing on capacity development.
The initial step has to be a plan to get to a capacity development plan – how to assist local
authorities in getting to the point where they can formulate their own capacity development plan.
This typically requires, at least, designating a national authority which has responsibility for mine
action, staffing the authority and/or MAC with a few capable and motivated managers, exposing
these personnel to the mine action field and how it functions, and ensuring they are aware of
good practices based on experience in other countries.
Implementing such a preliminary plan often is fraught with problems. For example, the legal basis
of the new national authority may be seriously flawed, or the individuals appointed to key mine
action positions may lack appropriate skills or commitment. In such cases, scarce resources
should not be spent on supporting capacities that should not be developed. Thus, preliminary
plans should give priority to flexibility – typically it is better wait until essential preconditions are in
place rather than rush to spend the budget on schedule.
Preliminary plans should also allow the flexibility to capitalise on unforeseen opportunities. For
example, in some countries where the central government has lacked commitment to mine
action, governors in highly impacted states have been anxious to work with mine action
operators. Support for these state governments has then led governors to champion mine action
and to get it on the national development agenda.
Capacity development picks-up pace once the basic structures and a few committed people are
in place. This is borne out in the case in Sudan, where progress accelerated after the creation of
the NMAC and SSDC, and the adoption of the National Strategic Framework in August 2006.

In addition, the UNDP should continue its efforts to broker support for capacity development
from other international mine action agencies present in Sudan. UNMAO/UNMAS will play a
critical role, particularly in supporting the core capabilities required by national MACs –
operations planning; setting priorities; quality management; and information management.
However, other UN agencies (particularly UNICEF for MRE) and the international NGOs
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(including NPA, which has already expressed it’s interest) could also provide valuable support
for the development of national capacities in the MACs and local NGOs. Finally, Cranfield
University has already established a mine action training programme for Sudan, and raised much
of the funding required directly from donors.
Where possible, commitments to provide capacity development support should be reflected in the
national capacity development plan, as well as in the medium-term and annual plans of the
agencies involved (i.e. as sections outlining their plans for supporting the development of local
capacities).
The more success the UNDP has in brokering support for capacity development from other
international mine action agencies, the less need for it to raise substantial sums for its own
project. Indeed, in some countries, aggressive fundraising by the UNDP has been a point of
contention with other mine action agencies, creating a competitive rather than a collaborative
environment. The UNDP should build on the collaborative relations that now prevail in Sudan
and provide only those capacity development support services that other agencies cannot.81
Recommendation 4 – The UNDP should focus its efforts on assisting Sudanese authorities in
formulating their strategic and capacity development plans, including the facilitation of
consultations with mine action stakeholders.
Recommendation 5 – So far as possible, the UNDP should aim to broker capacity development
support from other international mine action agencies present in Sudan (UN, Cranfield
University, international NGOs, etc.), and finance only those capacity development support
services that other agencies cannot provide.
MAKING BEST USE OF THE JIDUs
The JIDUs now represent the bulk of the local demining capacity in Sudan. As well, they provide
a concrete example of effective collaboration between the GoNU and the GoSS (and between the
two armed forces). The Babanusa-Wau railway is an essential link between the North and South,
and the work of the JIDUs towards the rehabilitation of that link is precisely the type of initiative
that needs to be replicated many times over ‘to make unity attractive’. The JIDUs could also be
expanded, absorbing troops from both the SAF and the SPLA and contributing to DDR. More
should be done to make best use of the JIDUs within the mine action programme. This, however,
should be done in a manner consistent with the UN Inter-Agency Mine Action Policy.
Textbox 9 – UN Policy on Support to National Militaries Engaged in Mine Action
The UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action first adopted a policy on the use of
militaries in January 1999, as an addendum to its initial UN mine action policy document, Mine
Action and Effective Coordination, October 1998. This addendum stated that support to national
militaries for mine action would be considered on a case-by-case basis, with several caveats
(e.g. the overall coordination, control and priority setting of mine action should be the
responsibility of civilian authorities). It stated that collaboration with militaries could include
tasking, quality control, information sharing and logistical support. No mention was made of
training, equipping, and support to capacity development in general.

81

For example, the UNDP may need to finance short-term experts to facilitate strategic planning
or develop mine action legislation.
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In the 2005 revision to the UN Mine Action Policy, the policy vis-à-vis local militaries was
amended somewhat. For example:
•

•

In the event that national military forces or armed groups still involved in conflict request
assistance in mine action, the United Nations may support such activities, on an
exceptional basis…The terms and conditions of such assistance will normally be defined
in a Memorandum of Understanding between the parties to the conflict. United Nations
support in such circumstances is determined on a case-by-case basis by the Senior
United Nations Official in the country concerned, in consultation with the Inter-Agency
Coordination Group on Mine Action. (par. 33)
United Nations cooperation in the field of mine action may, in peacetime, support
national mine action programmes that include collaborative arrangements with the
national armed forces as long as the overall coordination, control and priority-setting
of mine action is the responsibility of national civilian authorities. Such cooperation may
include the provision of training, equipment and operating costs, but not the payment of
salaries. (par. 32)

In addition, the policy stipulates that All mine clearance operations involving the use of national
armed forces and/or armed groups conducted with the support of the United Nations in
peacetime or in a conflict situation should be undertaken using IMAS, or national standards
based on IMAS. (par. 34)
Thus, in the opinion of the Evaluation Team, UNMAO could collaborate with and support the
JIDUs provided that:
1. Civilian authorities are in charge of overall coordination, control and priority-setting of the
tasks assigned to the JIDUs;
2. The demining conducted by the JIDUs is compliant with IMAS; and
3. The Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action endorses a specific plan for
collaboration and support.

The first essential step is to accredit the JIDUs to ensure they work in compliance with IMAS.82
These units could then be assigned to national priorities, jointly endorsed by the GoNU and GoSS
through their respective mine action authorities. Staff from the NMAC and SSDC (or better, a
separate Southern Sudan MAC, as discussed below), assisted by UNMAO personnel, could then
do the quality assurance of the JIDU tasks, providing invaluable on-the-job training
opportunities.
Recommendation 6 – UNMAO should agree a work plan with Sudanese authorities for
accrediting the JIDUs, including, if necessary, further capacity development to allow these units
to operate in compliance with IMAS.
Recommendation 7 – UNMAO should agree a work plan with Sudanese authorities for quality
assurance of the JIDU tasks by QA officers from NMAC and a Southern Sudan MAC, supported
by UNMAO personnel.
ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOUTHERN SUDAN MAC
Presidential Decree No. 45/2006 established a Southern Sudan De-mining Authority (generally
referred to as the Southern Sudan De-mining Committee). Since it was created, the SSDC has
82

Additional training, equipment, and advice may be required.
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engaged approximately 40 staff and opened a number of sub-offices. It appears that the SSDC
intends to assume the responsibilities of a MAC. Experience from other countries demonstrates
that most attempts to have the functions of a mine action authority and a MAC integrated into a
single organisation have failed.
Fortunately, Presidential Decree No. 45/2006 states that the Authority shall collaborate with the
Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development in the formulation of its Draft Act…
The UNDP should, in conjunction with its UNMAO partners and other mine action organisations,
urge the SSDC to include in the draft legislation provision for a Southern Sudan MAC as a
distinct organisation.83
Recommendation 8 – The UNDP should, in conjunction with its UNMAO partners and other
mine action organisations, assist the SSDC in drafting mine action legislation that incorporates
provisions for a Southern Sudan MAC as a distinct organisation.

83

The division of responsibilities outlined in decree establishing the National Authority for Mine
Action (Decree no. 299/2005) provides a useful model for this part of the draft legislation.
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ANNEX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION OF THE UNDP SUDAN MINE
ACTION CAPACITY BUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Background:
1. Sudan is considered as one of the countries suffering the most from the /Explosives
Remnants of War (ERW) contamination problem although the problem lies more in the
perception of a threat than a real threat. Most of the access/supply routes and roads are
blocked in central, eastern and southern parts of the country. In addition, vast areas of
arable land, livestock grazing land, areas required for collecting firewood and producing
charcoal and water resources are blocked. Landmine and ERW contamination in Sudan is
impacting the post-war recovery phase as it directly affects the return and settlement of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, the access and implementation of
humanitarian and development activities, freedom of movement, and freedom to conduct
economic activities and thereby the sustainable livelihoods of affected communities.
2. Current assessments have identified more than 1,920 dangerous/suspected areas of
which only 760 have been cleared. As of April 2007, more than 14 million m2 of land have
been cleared, 3,221 km of roads verified as safe, and 850 km of those were cleared, 4,164
Anti-Personnel mines, 1,911 Anti-Tank mines, and more than 474,000 ERW destroyed.
Under the overall coordination of UNICEF, more than one Million Sudanese civilians have
received Mine Risk Education (MRE). The IMSMA database in Sudan has also recorded a
total of 2,400 victims. However, there is now nation-wide surveillance system in place to
provide timely and accurate information about the casualty rate.
Mine Action in the Sudan:
3. A number of international mine action organizations have been active in the field of
mine action in Southern Sudan since early 90s. However, after the signing of the Nuba
Mountains Ceasefire Agreement in 2001, the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) started to cooperate in the area of mine action,
which established a unique precedent for cooperation and peace-building even during
ongoing conflict. Based on this cooperation, a tri-partite Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) was signed among the GoS, the SPLM and the United Nations Mine Action Service
(UNMAS) on 19 September 2002 in Geneva, which provided the framework for mine action
activities to be undertaken throughout the Sudan. In addition, the CPA and the UN Security
Council Resolution 1590 further enhanced the mandate and role of the UN in the Sudan in
the field of mine action.
4. Currently, there are five UN agencies actively engaged in undertaking various mine
action activities within the unified framework of the United Nations Mine Action Office
(UNMAO) in close coordination and cooperation with the concerned national and local
authorities. The UN agencies involved in mine action and their respective roles include:
 United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), in cooperation with the United
Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), conducting humanitarian demining and
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providing coordination and technical advice in support of the UNMIS mandate
and the CPA.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), providing support to national
authorities in building sustainable local/national mine action capacities,
United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), undertaking mine risk education
projects,
World Food Programme (WFP) undertaking clearance of key supply and access
routes,
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) providing mine risk
education returning refugees and IDP and undertaking clearance of areas
required for resettlement of refugees and IDPs.

5. In addition, there are several demining companies operating as part of the UN Peace
Support Force, several national and international humanitarian organizations and
commercial firms, involved in undertaking mine action operations in various parts of the
country, with the UN Mine Action Office serving as the coordinating body.
UNDP’s Role and Mandate in Mine Action in the Sudan:
6. Within the unified structure of the UN Mine Action Office, UNDP is the lead agency for
national capacity building and programme development. The UNDP’s approach to mine
action in the Sudan is guided by the provisions of the ”Mine Action and Effective
Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy” as well as the UN inter-agency Mine
action Strategy 2006-2010.
7. In order to address the landmine/ERW contamination problem in the Sudan in the long
term, the Sudan requires developing national mine action capacity to coordinate, manage
and implement all mine action related activities in order to effectively address the
humanitarian and development challenges in the Sudan in the long term. To achieve this
goal, this project provides necessary management and technical support to the concerned
national mine action authorities to enable them to function as coordinating and executing
agencies, at the policy, strategic and operational level with limited external assistance and
support.
8. The expected/desired outcome of UNDP’s support to mine action in the Sudan is a well
established legislative and institutional framework, with a network of decentralized
organizational structures across the country, capable to coordinate, plan, prioritize, quality
manage, monitor and implement all aspects of mine action in the country as per
international standards and norms.
9. UNDP Sudan assisted concerned national authorities within the Government of
National Unity (GONU) and the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) to establish the
required legislative and institutional framework, develop individual and national capabilities,
develop policies and national standards and strategic plans; deliver all elements of mine
action efficiently and to IMAS; establish comprehensive information management systems
necessary for the efficient planning and prioritization of mine action activities and ensure
the quality of mine action operations. In addition, UNDP Sudan assists national authorities
to prepare for an effective and well planned transition to national management.
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10. UNDP works with NMAA, NMAC and SSDC and other concerned government
institutions to include mine action into the broader development agenda and to promote
mainstreaming of mine action into national and sector development
11. UNDP provides support and works closely with relevant authorities and civil society
organizations to ensure that landmine survivors are provided with rehabilitation and
reintegration services and enjoy being full productive members of their communities.
Management Structure/Modality and Partnership:
12. Under the overall supervision of the UNDP Sudan Country Director, this project is being
executed under the UNDP’s Direct Execution (DEX) modality and managed by the UNDP
Senior Technical Advisor-Mine Action within the “Human Security and Recovery Unit” with
an international Technical Advisor based in Juba and two Senior National Officers once
based in Khartoum and one based in Juba. In accordance with the UNDP’s rules and
regulations for DEX projects, the project management team is responsible for ensuring the
application of the UNDP guidelines (programme, finance, and personnel) and related
policies for the execution of this project. The project management team also ensures that
the project achieves its goals and objectives by supervising all project activities and
conducting monitoring and evaluation missions to project sites, and preparing progress,
monitoring and evaluation reports/updates to the UNDP CO management and donors. The
project team also coordinates its activities with the New York based UNDP/BCPR mine
action team and with other components of the UN Mine Action Office.
13. The line ministry for this project at the level of the Government of National Unity (GNU)
is the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs through the secretariat of the National Mine Action
Authority (NMAA) while at level of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), it is the
Office of the Presidential Affairs. The key implementing partners/counterparts of this project
are the at national level, the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) in the North; the
Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC).
Summary of the Achievements of the Project:
14. Achievements of the technical, advisory and financial assistance of this project to
Sudan are summarized below:
a. Establishment of the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and Southern Sudan
Demining Commission.(SSDC)
b. Development and endorsement by both GONU and GOSS of the “National Mine
Action Policy Framework” and “ National Mine Action Strategic Framework for 20062011’
c. Lobbied with the GONU and GOSS who included mine action in their budgets.
d. Establishment of the head offices NAMC and SSDC and six field offices in terms of
development of organization structures, offices space, necessary equipment
(vehicles, computers and furniture), and trained about 45 staff members of NMAC
and SSDA in middle management in Amman, Jordan. In addition, UNDP trained 8
senior national staff members of NMAC and SSDA outside Sudan in senior
management.
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e. Organized and partially sponsored two Mine Action Exchange (MAX) missions to
Jordan and Bosnia Herzegovina with the participation of two State Ministers.
During the missions issues related to legislative and institutional frameworks,
planning and prioritization processes, quality assurance, national level coordination
mechanisms, tool box of mine action assets, donor relations/resources
mobilizations transition from UN management to national management, national
ownership and leadership were looked at.
f. Organized and partially sponsoring participation of the officials of the GONU and
GOSS in several official key mine action meetings/workshops including the all the
States Parties Meeting, and interssional committees meetings in 2004, 20005, and
2006. .
g. Training and field deployment of 133 national deminers
h. Provided technical assistance to development of the first draft of the National Mine
Action Laws at the level of the GONU. .
i. As part of a joint UNDP, UNMAS, and UNICEF project, mobilized US$ 688,000 for
the implementation of community level small projects for the rehabilitation and socio
economic re-integration of landmine victims/survivors. Other two components of this
project MRE and needs assessment are undertaken by UNICEF and UNMAS
respectively.
j. UNDP also provided technical assistance to the National Authority on Prosthetics
and Orthotics (NAPO) in resources mobilization and meeting the obligations of the
Sudan under the Nairobi Action Plan.
Rationale and Aim of the Evaluation:
15. UNDP regularly conducts internal and external evaluations of its projects and
programmes including mine action. Evaluation results, in particular lessons learned, are
made available to all partners and other interested parties. Based on its mandate,
stipulated in the “United Nations Inter-Agency Policy” UNDP Sudan got engaged in mine
action support in early 2004. UNDP Sudan feels that after four years of support, it is timely
to conduct an internal evaluation of the project.
16. The aim of this evaluation is to evaluate the performance and overall approach of the
project from January 2004 to July 2007 to take stock of the achievements made, identify
major gaps, lessons learned and make recommendations for the future direction for the
project. The evaluation should take into account, obligations of the Sudan under the AntiPersonnel Mine Ban Treaty, recent political developments in the country, the provisions the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), UN Security Council Resolution # 1590,
presidential decrees of the GONU and GOSS on the establishment of the National Mine
Action Authority (NMAA) and Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC),
development and endorsement of the “National Mine Action Policy Framework” and
“National Mine Action Strategic Framework” , the UN Inter Agency Mine Action Policy, the
UN Mine Action Strategy for 2006-2011 and other relevant documents including the UNDP
Sudan Project Document and the UN Mine Action Annual work Plans for 2005, 2006, 2007
and 2008.
Objectives of the Evaluation:
17. Evaluate the UNDP Sudan mine action project management structure, its coordination
and collaboration at various levels within the UNDP Country Office (Both Khartoum and
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Juba), with other UNDP units/projects and within the UNDP global management
arrangements in relation to small arms and mine action issues.
18. Evaluate the in-country inter-agency (UNMAS, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP) cooperation
and coordination mechanisms/arrangements and UNDP’s capacity to deliver against the
mine action plan/ strategy in Sudan.
19. Evaluate the sustainability of UNDP’s project as well as UNDP’s performance in
delivering technical assistance as per its specific role and mandate for mine action in
Sudan.
20. Evaluate UNDP’s performance in providing institutional and individual capacity
development support.
21. Evaluate mine action authorities abilities to plan, quality manage, coordinate and
manage mine action?
22. Evaluate the technical support provided by the project to the National Mine Action
Authority (NMMA), NMAC, SSDC, concerned civil society organizations at various levels
and in various fields and ascertain their feedback.
23. Evaluate the resource mobilization approach and strategy of the project and utilization
of the project resources and future plans.
24. In view of the findings of the evaluation and in light of UNDP’s mandate, provide
recommendations on the definition of specific outcomes and activities in the area of mine
action that will then feed into the preparation of the United Nations Development
Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Sudan for the period of 2009-2012.
25. Evaluate UNDP’s performance in the process of mainstreaming mine action within the
wider humanitarian and development community.
26. Evaluate the role and performance of the project in light of UNDP policy on support to
landmine Survivors/Victims.
27. Review and comment on the process and progress of the establishment of the
legislative and institutional frameworks for mine action at the level of GONU and GOSS in
view of the transition of the mine action management from the UN to the national
authorities planned for 2011. Identify key capacity building and institutional development
gaps and make necessary recommendations for bridging those gaps.
28. Review and comment on the inter-ministerial level coordination and cooperation
mechanisms within the GONU and GOSS in regards to mine action and between the
NMAC and SSDC.
29. Review and comment on the management structures of the NMAC and SSDC and
progress made in establishing various management functions of these authorities such as
planning, coordination, quality assurance, monitoring, information management, resource
mobilization, and reporting.
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30. Review and comment on the possible political and other implications for a sustainable
and fully nationally owned managed mine action programme (s).
31. Comment on the gender considerations of the project.
Timescale:
32. The Evaluation is planned to take place in late October 2007, depending on the
availability of the consultants and other factors. The evaluation is estimated to take a total
of three weeks time with half of the time inside Sudan and the other half outside Sudan. A
detailed itinerary and workplan shall be developed by the Independent Consultants in
coordination with the UNDP Sudan Country Office with the Senior Technical Advisor-Mine
Action as the focal point.
Debriefing and Reporting
33. The consultant shall debrief the UNDP Sudan management in a meeting through a
PowerPoint presentation before his/her departure from Sudan and prepare and submit a
detailed final report which shall cover findings, observations, and recommendations to the
UNDP Sudan County Office within 10 days of the completion of the evaluation.
Cost of the Evaluation:
34. Mine Action Project of UNDP Sudan and the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) will share the cost of the evaluation. UNDP Sudan will cover the cost of
airfare, terminal expenses, accommodation and food of the consultants while GICHD will
cover the cost of the time of the consultants.
Mission Composition:
35. The evaluation will be conducted by two independent consultant provided by GICHD
with the following skills and experience:
a) Extensive experience in conducting project’s evaluations
b) Extensive experience in all aspects of institutional and individual capacity
building. Specific experience in mine action capacity building would be an asset
c) Extensive experience in the coordination, management and implementation of
mine action programmes/projects
d) A good understanding of general development principles and the role and
priorities of mine action within a multi-sector post-conflict response
36. The consultants should be self-sufficient in relation to personal medical requirements
and funds and be prepared to work in difficult living conditions. It is suggested that the
consultant should have personal accident and medical insurance with specific cover for
operating in security-sensitive locations such as the Sudan.
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ANNEX 2 – ITINERARY & LIST OF PEOPLE MET
Khartoum – Ted Paterson & Vera Bohle
22-Oct
Arrive Khartoum
23-Oct
UNMAO
Qadeem Tariq (initial briefing)
UNDP
Jerzy Skuratowicz, Country Director
Omer Ishaq, Head, Human Security & Recovery Unit
Musa Ibrahim, Programme Officer, Mine Action
Khartoum – Vera Bohle
24 Oct
UNDP
Khalid Abdin, Senior National Officer for Mine Action in
North Sudan
NMAC
Baballah Braima, Deputy Director
Yousif M. Osman, Victim Assistance Officer
Dr. Ahmed E. Yousif, Victim Assistance Officer
Adil A. Hameed, Legal Advisor
Abd Almonem Ahmed Giha, Technical Advisor
Abdelazim Elshielch, Training Officer
UNMAO
Jim Pansegrouw, Director
Akiko Kobayakawa, Programme Officer
UNDP
Alexander O’Riordan, Recovery and Rehabilitation
Programme (RRP) Manager
Mariam A. AlRahman Ali, Monitoring and Evaluation
Analyst RRP
25 Oct
SCBL
Abdel Ati Eid, Coordinator Sudan Campaign to Ban
Landmines
UNDP
Maximo Halty, CTA Threat and Risk Mapping Project
(former Head of Security and Recovery and DDR
Programme Manager in Sudan)
NMAC
Baballah Braima, Deputy Director
MAG
Frederic Maio, Project Manager North Sudan
JASMAR
Dr. Hussein Elobeid, General Manager
Mohammed Abdel Rahman Elbushra, Finance and
Administrative Manager
FPDO
Zaki El Jack Jailani, Executive Director Friends of Peace
and Development Organisation
Juba – Ted Paterson
24 Oct
Travel Khartoum  Juba
UNDP-Juba
Qadeem Tariq, UNDP STA Mine Action
Pacifico Ladu Augustino, Senior National Officer
UNDP-Juba
George Conway, Deputy Head, UNDP Juba
25 Oct
UNMAO-Juba
Simon Porter, Deputy Director
Paul Elred, Regional Operations Coordinator
SSDC
Jurkuc Barak, Chairperson
Taban Lupai, Commissioner
Makuei Philemon, Commissioner
Victor Yuggu Young, QA/QC Officer
Deng Mabeny Kuot, IMSMA Officer
Patrick Lumumba Ochieng, Finance Officer
Peter Madiny, Head of Accounting
Malek Deng Malek, MRE/VA Officer
Albino Deng Juach, Public Relations Officer
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Simon Yak Deng, Office Manager
UNDP
Dean Piedmont, Deputy Programme Director, DDR
TDI
Léonie Barnes, Country Director
26 Oct
NPA (at UNDP)
Kjell Ivan Breili, Operations Manager, Mine Action
DDG (at UNDP)
Chris Bath, Programme Manager
MAG
Jamie Franklin, Project Manager
27 Oct
Travel Juba  Khartoum
Khartoum – Ted Paterson & Vera Bohle
28 Oct
UNMAO
David Naggi, UN-Victim Assistance Coordinator
UNMIS
Basil Massey, Programme Manager, DDR
World Bank
Mohammed Usman Bashir, Road Engineer
29 Oct
UNICEF
Bo Viktor Nylund, Head, Child Protection
Ida Hyllest, Programme Officer
UNDP
Auke Lootsma, Deputy Country Director
Departure
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ANNEX 3 – DOCUMENTS CONSULTED
Peace Agreements
Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, 2006
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, 9 Jan 2005

Decrees
Government of the Republic of Sudan, 2005, Presidential Decree No. (299), for the year 2005:
On the Formation of the National Mine Action Authority. (unofficial translation)
Government of the Republic of Sudan, 2005, Cabinet Decree No. (283) for 2006: Endorsement of
Strategic Mine Action Framework.
Government of Southern Sudan, 2006, Presidential Decree 45/2006

Mine Action Documents
Gomer, Lisa, Robert Keeley and Steven Olijas, 2007, Evaluation of the Mine Action Programme
in Sudan for the United Nations Mine Action Service
Government of Sudan and UNDP-Sudan, 2005, Support to National Mine Action Capacity
Development Project
International Mine Action Standards, 2007, IMAS 02.10 – Guide on the establishment of a mine
action programme, (draft) http://www.mineactionstandards.org/imas.htm
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Sudan, The Sudan Peoples
Liberation Movement and the United Nations Regarding United Nations Mine Action Support to
Sudan, 2002
National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework, March 2007-12-14
Sudan Mine Action: Mine Action Policy Framework, July 2004 (adopted by the GoS, SPLM/A,
and UNMAS)
Sudan Mine Action Strategic Framework, August 2004 (adopted by the GoS, SPLM, UNDP, and
UNMAS)
The Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework, 2006
UNDP Sudan (various years) Mine Action Annual Reports
UNMAO, 2007, 2007 Work Plan: Mine Action Sector.
Victim Assistance National Work Plan: September 2007 – August 2009

Other Documents
GICHD, 2007, Mission to Sudan, (country mission report as part of the regional evaluation of
EC-funded mine action in Africa)
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Government of Sudan, 2007, The Five Year Plan: 2007-2011, [draft] National Council for
Strategic Planning.
Haslie, Anita and Axel Borchgrevink, 2007, International Engagement in Sudan after the CPA:
Report on the piloting of OECD/DAC’s ‘Principles for Good International Engagement in
Fragile States’ for the Case of Sudan, NUPI Report No. 714, The Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs.
UN Country Team, 2007, UN Development Assistance Framework: Plan of Engagement
UNDP, 2006?, UNDP Sudan Strategic Framework for the Bridging Programme: 2007-08.
UNDP, 2007, Supporting Capacity Development: The UNDP Approach. Capacity Development
Group, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP
United Nations, 2005, Sudan Unified Mission Plan.
United Nations, 2007, Sudan – Country Analysis, (draft of 18 Oct. 2007)
United Nations Security Council, (various dates since 2005), Reports of the Secretary-General on
the Sudan.
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1590 (2005) [establishing UNMIS]
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ANNEX 4 – COMMENTS FROM UNMAO ON THE DRAFT REPORT

United Nations Mine Action Office (UNMAO)
Plot 42, Block 13, Riyadh Area, Khartoum P.O.Box 913, Khartoum, Sudan
The report are a reasonably balanced observation, and the need of the Govt's strategic plan in order to
develop a comprehensive transitional plan is paramount (although it does not address the point about why it
has not been done and not supported by UNDP after four years). It also did not answer one of the crucial
questions in terms of relationships in an Integrated or Unified Mine Action Office – see point six
Some of specific points are;
1. JIDU - a good analysis on JIDU issues. It does not address the point about why UNDP supported such a
unit without QA support and a unit that does NOT conform to international standards. The role of the
British High Commision can be enhanced, as they are the real driver behind this initiative.
Recommendation 6 talks about UNMAO support to JIDU and this can be done if the Govt is ready to
comply with IMAS and necessary funding are provided (either from donors or from the Govt) to UNMAO
to hire additional QA. Still some fundamental questions remain though such as are UNMAO supposed to
be supporting a military unit.
Comment from Evaluation Team (ET) – We have added a textbox on UN policy vis-à-vis military
units and mine action.
2. UNDP comparative advantages (Page 34) - there is no doubt that UNDP has a vital role, but the last 2
points (Good relationship with Govt and Arabic speaking) are very ad-hoc, and limited . It was definitely
not the case for South Sudan that UNDP always had a good relationship and Arabic speaking in the
south???. As to Arabic speaking, this advantage will be lost once Qadeem leaves so this is not an
organizational advantage, and this caused some issues in South Sudan as some of Southerner have issues
with Arabic-speaking people. 3rd point can also be debated - UNMAS CAN and have a mandate
beyond 1590 with VTF funding, and we are actually implementing MRE and VA which are beyond
UNMIS mandate.
Comment from ET – We are aware that SC Resolution 1590 mandate is not restrictive & have
added some statements to ensure this is clear. Our point is that the UNMAS mandate obliges
support to UNMIS (and this responsibility cannot simply be transferred to national authorities),
whereas additional tasks (e.g. demining in support of development) are possible but not
obligatory.
3. Recommendations - 1,2 and 3 are making sense, especially the 3rd one that says that UNDP does not
need to do an excessive resource mobilization. Recommendation 4 is good, but means that UNDP needs to
hire a specialist. Both STA and TA are not a transition or public administration specialist.
Recommendation 5,6 and 7 are good but again there must be an appropriate resource allocation to this.
Recommendation 8 is great and again, UNDP needs a long-awaited legal specialist as STA and TA are not
legal specialist.
Comment from ET – We agree that the UNDP may need to engage specialists re: strategic
planning and planning for capacity development. However, the UNMAO Transitions Planner was
not yet in place and we were not in a position to assess whether that individual might handle the
bulk of the tasks in conjunction with the UNDP mine action team.
4. UNMAS role -There is a basic misunderstanding that we are only obliged to UNMIS mandate - either
Peacekeeping or Humanitarian priorities, but it is not true. VTF funding can be used for development
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priorities too within the current UNMAS/UNMAO set up, when donors are willing and priorities are
agreed by all stakeholders.
Comment from ET – see comments under point 2
5. The observations and recommendations are fairly reasonable and what UNDP mow need is a proper
work plan based on Govt strategy with specialists, not project managers. Currently both STA and TA are
functioning as project officers managing their own small projects and travels of training, but no "technical"
expertise on transitional planning or legislation development.. It must also be cautioned that some of the
comments, while accurate are somewhat misleading and create the wrong perceptions.
Comment from ET – in addition to comments under point 3, we agree that UNDP should engage
some expertise in mine action legislation once the GoSS/SSDC are committed to move on the
issue of mine action legislation in Southern Sudan.
6. The report does not answer the vital question, is UNDP MA part of an Integrated or unified UNMAO
and what is the relationship with the Director MA Sector (if such a position exist in a country) or is it
independent form a UNMAO?. This relationship is not clear in the UN Strategy for MA – the roles of the
different agencies etc has been defined but not in terms of an Integrated or Unified mission.
Comment from ET – an important point, and we have added a rather long textbox on the ‘unified’
versus ‘integrated’ question. In our view, UNDP MA is part of a unified UNMAO and, as such, is
neither independent from nor subsumed within UNMAO – rather, it is collocated and should strive
to operate in accordance with the principles laid-out in the Unified Mission Plan.
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ANNEX 5 – COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT FROM UNDP
BCPR
Re: Evaluation of UNDP Sudan Mine Action capacity building and development
project.
Inputs from: Armed Violence, Mine Action and Small Arms
Conflict Prevention and Recovery Team
BCPR New York and Geneva
1.

Long term strategic plan

Transition planning should be part of larger, long term strategic plan, which
encompasses all aspects of transition including capacity building. The transition
marks the process of reaching miles stones towards progressively handing over
all elements of mine action to the national government. A capacity building
strategy would build on and address the indentified gaps in a national partner’s
capacity and capability to take over responsibly for mine action.
In North and South Sudan the transition plan would prepare the establishment of
a capacity able to address residual contamination – estimated at 20% by
UNMAO – remaining on UNMAO’s departure. The planning for dealing with this
residual contamination would make up the body of the long term strategic plan
implemented from 2011. Although there cannot at this time be precise figures in
terms of planning for the post 2011 status of contamination, extrapolations of
current data from the LIS and technical surveys will allow us to foresee what level
of capacity will be required post UNMAO departure.
It is towards the development of this level of technical capacity and the
administration, management and QA systems to support it, that the transition
plan must focus. Whether or not this requires expansion of capacity in terms of
hardware and well as the human resource focus of capacity building remains to
be seen. It has been noted by BCPR that human resource development – the
“softer” side of capacity building - is in need of a greater attention and focus in
2008. At this point the consolidation of current assets and strategizing towards
their most efficient use in developing a strong capacity which can address
residual contamination post 2011, should be UNDP’s active focus.
In order to develop such a comprehensive strategic document addressing
transition, capacity building and longer term capacity to deal the ERW in Sudan,
support will be required in both north and south Sudan. To this end BCPR and will
be making this part of the terms of reference for Sara and Pontus during the
planned integrated mission to Sudan in April.
2.

Role of the GOS in capacity building / recommendation 2
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We have a concern with the way that capacity building is presented in this
report. The idea that capacity building is the responsibility of the national
authorities and that UNDP is one step removed i.e. there to support it and broker
relationships from the outside. Part of the responsibility of the Government, under
international treaties, is to put in place an effective institutional structure that can
regulate/coordinate and manage mine action in the country. It is the
responsibility/mandate of UNDP to provide capacity building support to the
government to achieve this end should it be called on to do so. The host
government of the countries in which UNDP works request the support of UNDP,
and basing its mandate on support of the implementation of the UNDAF, create
MOUs shaped by the host government itself. This is more of an active role than
the somewhat passive one presented in the evaluation report.
Recommendations for encouraging coordination on the part of the government
– ways of increasing capacity to do so would have been useful. E.g. page 19
comments on the lack of success in convening the DSRSG.
Comments from Evaluation Team (ET) – We’re not clear what the concern re: “how capacity
building is presented” – the emphasis on the fact that it is local people and organisations which
develop capacity and that the role of international partners is to support the capacity development
efforts of locals is one of the central messages of about a decade’s work by UNDP’s central
capacity development unit & others and is reflected in the name of the current UNDP project
(Support to National Mine Action Capacity Development). This distinction is also one of the
central principals distinguishing ‘new’ capacity development (espoused by UNDP) and ‘old’
capacity building – see, for example, from Supporting Capacity Development: The UNDP
Approach (June 2007) Capacity development is a primarily endogenous and domestically driven
process. and Capacity development efforts must be led and grounded in endogenous efforts if
they are to be meaningful and sustainable. UNDP will work closely with the UN development
system, and global, regional and national partners, to support CD efforts through the provision of
these services. What we are recommending is consistent with the UNDP approach (an approach
with which we concur).
Perhaps the concern is that our report advocates a ‘brokering’ more than a ‘resource
mobilisation’ role. In our minds, this reflects the current situation in Sudan where UNMAS has so
many resources in country which should be playing a significant role in supporting capacity
development. As well, one of the principles underpinning the ‘unified’ approach (from Sudan
Unified Mission Plan) is “Responsibility to maximize shared resources.” In other countries, UNDP
is the lead UN agency and has to shoulder more of the resource mobilisation burden. But we
don’t see UNDP’s role as passive – its TAs have to assist Sudanese authorities in defining their
long-term requirements, then brokering-in the requisite support that is available (including from
the Sudanese budgets, which are significant), and filling gaps where necessary support isn’t
available.
Concerning “Recommendations for encouraging coordination on the part of the government”, we
noted the State Minister for Humanitarian Affairs has taken the initiative to establish a mine action
steering committee, which is a good initiative. As well, the process of strategic planning will
encourage coordination on the part of the government, so long as UN agencies, donors, etc.
adhere to the precept that the Sudanese governments remain ‘in the driver’s seat.’

3.

Capacity building direction
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The situation report regarding the current hardware capacity of national bodies
in Sudan was useful and was welcomed. However, recommendations which
encourage the consolidation of current assets and the development of the
softer side of capacity as opposed to hardware would have been useful. BCPR
is weary of the current drive to emulate the UNMAO structure. There should be a
consolidation of current hardware and a focus on the software. These are issues
which have been discussed with our national counterparts in terms of strategic
planning for the next 5 years and are ones which are ongoing and valuable in
terms of sustainability.
Comments from ET – our view is that Sudanese officials, drawing upon the advice from UN
agencies and others, will be capable of determining what is needed re: the “softer side of
capacity” as part of a structured process to develop their national strategy. We have also added a
note that the draft IMAS 02.10 – Guide for the establishment of a mine action programme,
contains excellent guidance on the roles, responsibilities, and capacity requirements of national
authorities and MACs.

4.

Content of capacity building

The evaluation does not give many indications with respect to what kind of
capacity building is needed and specifically on what areas should be
strengthened, in light of the evaluation of the existing UNDP programme. A
stronger evaluation of the UNDP programme would have set the stage for more
concrete and directly applicable recommendations in this respect.
Comments from ET – Again, we have also added a note that the draft IMAS 02.10 – Guide for
the establishment of a mine action programme, contains excellent guidance on the roles,
responsibilities, and capacity requirements of national authorities and MACs. As well, our report
makes clear that what is most needed for further development of capacities is on-the-job
experience at a number of levels (e.g. deminers in JIDUs working to IMAS with QA inspections;
personnel in the MACs managing the tasking cycle with guidance from UNMAS TAs; senior
officials in strategic planning).

5.

JIDUs

We agree with the analysis of the situation, as well as with the recommendations
of UNMAO with regards to working towards JIDU accreditation and quality
assurance. However, it would be useful if the report would also make specific
recommendations to UNDP with respect to (i) how UNDP should engage with the
JIDUs and (ii) the entry points through which UNDP can actively support and
promote the accreditation and coordination of the JIDUs and support the
qualitative improvement of their technical and management capacity.
Comments from ET – the strategic planning process that we have recommended is an ideal
‘entry point’ for engaging with the JIDUs. We have added a textbox on UN policy vis-à-vis the use
of local militaries in mine action and our understanding of what these policies imply in the case of
the JIDUs.

6.

UNDP role in UNMAO / feedback on UNMAS report
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Inclusion of material from the UNMAS evaluation of mine action in Sudan was a
useful addition. If the evaluation could have addressed in greater depth /
followed up the perceived short comings of UNDP capacity building presented
in the UNMAS report and confirmed, quantified and qualified these it would
have been more useful than re-presenting them again in another forum.
Comments from ET – The limited duration of the evaluation mission made it impossible to
conduct a detailed assessment of the various capacity development initiatives supported by the
UNDP. We believe our report is clear in stating there is little evidence to support a blanket
disparagement of capacity development achievements to date (and the report on the evaluation
commissioned by UNMAS provides scant evidence to back-up its apparent censure of the
capacity development component). We pointed out that CD progress typically is slow until some
capable and committed managers are appointed, which really wasn’t the case until mid-2006
after which CD progress accelerated. We also noted that, ‘benchmarked’ against capacity
development achievements of other UN programmes in Sudan, all those we interviewed stated
that mine action was far ahead. Our principal criticism is that a proper strategic plan is not in
place and the process for formulating such a plan should already have begun.

The role and timeframe of UNDP in Sudan in terms of building a sustainable
national capacity both in the north and south is one which will extend beyond
that of UNMIS. As noted in the UNMAO feedback, UNMAS’ role is not predicated
on UNMIS’s mandate. UNDP’s comparative advantage lies in its long term
commitment to work with national counterparts and building their capacity to a
point where external assistance is no longer required. The role of UNDP in the
implementation of the transition plan, whereby national capacities will be able
to address contamination independently is one which will be in coordination
and cooperation with UNMAS in terms of technical input. Greater cooperation
and coordination between the respective elements of UNMAO is the only way
that capacity building throughout the transition can be guaranteed.
Recommendations that focus on increased cooperation and matricing of the
capacity building roles of the component departments of UNMAO would have
been helpful, as institutional arrangements will not allow us to separate lines of
reporting out of that of UNDP. Creative ways in which the CTAs in south and
north could function more efficiently and effectively in coordination with the UN
Mine Action office could also have been included.
Comments from ET – we have added a rather long textbox on the ‘unified’ versus ‘integrated’
controversy. In it we conclude that the six principles presented in the Sudan Unified Mission Plan
are reasonable but have not been put fully into practice. As well, once UNMAS, UNDP, and other
agencies are working on a common multi-year plan, coordination should be more efficient and
effective.
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